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PROTECTED CONCERTED ACTIVITY IN THE
NON-UNION CONTEXT: LIMITATIONS ON
THE EMPLOYER'S RIGHTS TO DISCIPLINE
OR DISCHARGE EMPLOYEES
Judith J. Johnson*
The fundamental purpose behind passage of the National Labor
Relations Act' was to promote the peaceful settlement of labor disputes
by providing legal remedies for the invasion of certain rights of employ-
ees.
The purpose of the Act was not to guarantee to employees the right to
do as they please but to guarantee them the right of collective bargain-
ing for the purpose of preserving industrial peace. The policy of the Act
is thus set forth, 29 U.S.C.A. sec. 151; "the denial by employers of the
right of employees to organize and the refusal by employers to accept
the procedure of collective bargaining lead to strikes and other forms
of industrial strife or unrest, which have the effect of burdening or
obstructing commerce."'
Inherent in this statement of purpose is the idea that the Act was
designed to counterbalance the employer's powerful bargaining position
by allowing employees the use of economic pressure to improve working
conditions both with and without the mediation of a union.3 Therefore,
in addition to providing the fundamental safeguards for employees'
rights to organize labor unions and to bargain collectively, the Act con-
fers important rights on employees not engaged in union activities or
organization. Section 7 of the Act guarantees the rights of employees "to
self-organization, to form, join, or assist labor organizations, to bargain
collectively through representatives of their own choosing, and to engage
in other concerted activities for the purpose of collective bargaining or
* Associate, Jolly, Miller & Milam, Jackson, Mississippi; B.A., 1969, University of
Texas; J.D., 1974, University of Mississippi.
1 29 U.S.C. §§ 151-87 (1976).
2 NLRB v. Draper Corp., 145 F.2d 199, 203 (4th Cir. 1944). For a brief discussion of
the purposes of and justifications for the Act see C. BuvoRD, THE WAGNER AcT-EM-
PLOYEE AND EMPLOYER RELATIONS §§ 3-4 (1941).
' See Getman, The Protection of Economic Pressure by Section 7 of the National
Labor Relations Act, 115 U. PA. L. Rzv. 1195, 1195-97 (1969); Note, The Requirement of
"Concerted" Action Under the NLRA, 53 COLUM. L. Rav. 514, 514-15, 526 (1953).
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other mutual aid or protection . . ... " The relevant portion of this
section in the non-union context is the right to engage in "concerted
activities" for "mutual aid or protection."5
Section 7 protects employees' rights by providing that employer
interference, restraint, or coercion of employees in the exercise of their
rights is an unfair labor practice under section 8(a)(1).1 Section 10(c)
empowers the National Labor Relations Board to order any affirmative
action that effectuates the purpose of the Act, including reinstatement
with or without back pay, as a remedy for the commission of an unfair
labor practice.7 By recognizing in section 10(c) that employees may be
discharged for "cause," ' the Act also preserves the employer's common
law right, subject to the limitations of statute and contract, to discharge
an employee at will. In the absence of a union contract, the statutory
29 U.S.C. § 157 (1976).
Concerted activity has been defined as referring "both to employees' actions and
the legal status of those actions, and as a result the term 'protected concerted activity'
has been uilized to indicate such activity which is protected by law from employer's
interference." 27 VAND. L. REv. 201, 202 n.8 (1974). Indeed, some writers suggest that the
legal definition of concerted activity could be better conveyed by the term "protected
activity" since the actual concert among employees has no significance unless it is in
furtherance of some objective viewed by both the Board and the courts as valid. Note,
Concerted Activity Under Section 7of the National Labor Relations Act, 1955 U. IL. L.F.
129, 130 (1955).
6 29 U.S.C. § 158(a)(1) (1976). Section 8 sets out specific unfair labor practices of
employers in addition to the general prohibition of § 8(a)(1). These include: domination
or interference with the development of labor organizations; giving financial or any other
support; discriminating in the hiring or treatment of employees to affect membership of
labor organizations; discharging or discriminating against an employee for filing charges
or testifying under § 8; and, refusing to bargain collectively. See 29 U.S.C. § 158(a)(2)-
(5) (1976).
1 29 U.S.C. § 160(c) (1976). See generally NLRB v. Dodson's Market, Inc., 553 F.2d
617, 620 (9th Cir. 1977) (back pay order supports public policy of Act); NLRB v. Martin
A. Gleason, Inc., 534 F.2d 466, 478-79 (2d Cir. 1976) (back pay order is to reimburse actual
losses of wages and deter future violations); Marriott Corp. v. NLRB, 491 F.2d 367, 371
(9th Cir. 1974) (back pay orders allowed only to mitigate damages and prevent further
violations); NLRB v. Waukesha Lime & Stone Co., 343 F.2d 504, 509-10 (7th Cir. 1965)
(discriminatory refusal to rehire not requisite for reinstatement); NLRB v. Ellis & Watts
Prod., Inc., 297 F.2d 576, 577 (6th Cir. 1962) (reinstatement and back pay is remedial
relief, not a fine or penalty). It should be noted that reinstatement and back pay are
merely types of relief that may be appropriate and do not limit the remedial power of the
N LRB. NLRB v. Waumbec, 114 F.2d 226, 235 (1st Cir. 1940). Indeed, reinstatement and
awarding back pay are sanctions in addition to the NLRB's general power to issue orders
to cease and desist against the party engaging in unfair labor practices. 29 U.S.C. § 160(c)
(1976).
1 29 U.S.C. § 160(c) (1976); see NLRB v. Hartmann Luggage Co., 453 F.2d 178, 181-
82 (6th Cir. 1971) (reinstatement not allowed if refusal to rehire is based on legitimate
and substantial business reasons).
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limitation on the employer's right to discipline or discharge an employee
remains because "[tihe mantle of protection of concerted activities
• . .extends to both union and non-union employees."' 0
To the extent possible, this Article will be devoted to the situation
in which there is no union or union organizational activity. It should be
recognized that since the National Labor Relations Act does not distin-
guish between the statutory rights of union and non-union employees,
many of the cases involving the protected concerted activities of union
members are persuasive, if not binding, authority in the non-union
context. The limitations placed by the Act on employers' rights will be
delineated by an examination of the four factors upon which the courts
have placed emphasis-definition of the term "concerted," proper pur-
poses of concerted activity, the type of concerted activity involved, and
the ways that a protected activity may lose its protection.
I. DEFINING THE TERM "CONCERTED"
"[Flor employee activity to be protected under the Act, the activity
must not only have a lawful objective and be carried out by lawful and
proper means, but it must also be 'concerted'."" Employees' actions in
the nature of individual complaints are not concerted and are therefore
not protected.2 For example, an employee who sought sympathy from
other employees for his opposition to the employer's dress code was
discharged for disrupting the workforce.' 3 The Board, ruling that such
activities are purely personal rather than concerted, upheld the dis-
charge." Similarly, one employee's circulation of a petition demanding
the discharge of his foreman was held not to be concerted activity'" since
See Mushroom Transp. Co. v. NLRB, 330 F.2d 683, 685 (3d Cir. 1964) (discharge
upheld since not violative of any statute and employee was not covered under a union
contract). See generally Annot., 83 A.L.R.2d 532 (1962) (setting out limitations on dis-
charge of employees).
" Hugh H. Wilson Corp. v. NLRB, 414 F.2d 1345, 1347 (3d Cir. 1969), cert. denied,
397 U.S. 935 (1970); see Trustees of Boston Univ. v. NLRB, 548 F.2d 391, 392 n.1 (1st Cir.
1977) (nonunionized employees entitled to protection of NLRA); NLRB v. Washington
Aluminum Co., 370 U.S. 9, 14 (1962) (section 7 of NLRA protects employees with no
bargaining representative).
" NLRB v. Dawson Cabinet Co., 566 F.2d 1079, 1082 (8th Cir. 1977).
" See NLRB v. Buddies Supermarkets, Inc., 481 F.2d 714, 718-19 (5th Cir. 1973) (not
concerted activity when individual bargained over his own contract provisions); South-
west Latex Corp. v. NLRB, 426 F.2d 50, 56-57 (5th Cir. 1970) (upheld discharge of an
employee who classified his gripes as his own).
,s Midland Frame Div., 216 N.L.R.B. 302, 306 (1975).
, Id. at 305.
" Joanna Cotton Mills Co. v. NLRB, 176 F.2d 749, 753-54 (4th Cir. 1949). The court
noted that the employees signed the petition "without thought of mutual aid or protec-
tion, and with no purpose other than to help [the discharged employee] get rid of an
19781
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the petition was merely an extension of a personal quarrel the employee
had had with the foreman."6 Therefore, if a protest can be characterized
as purely personal and there are no other persons who are involved or
who would have benefited had the employee succeeded, the activity is
not concerted. 7 However, the employee's effort is concerted if it contains
some element of collective activity. 8
Although concerted activity usually connotes activity with fellow
employees, the protection afforded by section 7 is more extensive since
the definition of employee under the Act 9 is not restricted to employees
of the same employer." Thus, if an employee indicates support for a
group of striking employees, he may be engaged in protected concerted
activity since he is acting in concert with the striking employees regard-
less of whether the strikers are employees of his employer. Even when a
non-union employee refuses to cross a picket line, he is engaged in
concerted activity because he has "plighted his troth with the strikers,
joined in their common cause, and has thus become a striker himself."'"
unpopular [supervisor] who had angered him." Id. at 754. The court reasoned that "the
act was never intended to protect this sort of unwarranted interference with manage-
ment." Id.
"1 The Joanna Cotton court noted that the defiant and insulting attitude of the
employee toward his supervisor necessitated his discharge if discipline within the plant
was to be maintained. Id. at 753. But cf. Jeannette Corp., 217 N.L.R.B. 653, 656-57 (1975)
(discharge of employee for discussing salary demands with fellow employees unlawful
despite fact that the discussion violated a company rule on keeping salary figures confi-
dential).
11 See Mushroom Transp. Co. v. NLRB, 330 F.2d 683, 685 (3d Cir. 1964) (discussions
of employees' rights are not concerted activities when not in preparation for group action);
Continental Mfg. Corp., 155 N.L.R.B. 255, 257-58 (1965) (validated discharge of employee
for letter written criticizing management activities since not an effort to aid fellow employ-
ees).
es See Owens-Coming Fiberglass Corp. v. NLRB, 407 F.2d 1357, 1365 (4th Cir. 1969)
(discharge of two employees for circulating a petition attacking company policies held
unlawful); Tex-Logs, Inc., 112 N.L.R.B. 968, 972-73 (1955) (two employees discussing
wage rates with management on behalf of others is concerted activity even though other
employees subsequently deny they were authorized to do so).
"0 29 U.S.C. § 152(3) (1976).
20 Compare NLRB v. Circle Bindery, Inc., 536 F.2d 447, 452 (1st Cir. 1976) (discharge
of employee for reporting to his union about his non-union employer using union label on
products was unlawful even though action was to protect union, not fellow employees)
with Cervantes, 87 N.L.R.B. 877, 880 (1949) (activity between employee and agricultural
worker of the same employer not concerted since agricultural worker not employee under
NLRA). The Board in Cervantes said: "[W]e do not believe that one 'employee' and
nonemployees together may engage in protected concerted activities within the meaning
of the Act." Id. at 880-81.
11 NLRB v. Southern Greyhound Lines, 426 F.2d 1299, 1301 (5th Cir. 1970). In
Southern Greyhound Lines the court held that nonstriking employees who refused to cross
a picket line must be treated as "strikers" and therefore protected from discharge. Id. at
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Likewise, an employee's statement to one non-union employee express-
ing sympathy for a threatened strike has been deemed a concerted act
because it was regarded as an expression of support for a group action
in the interest of other employees.Y However, the employee's motive
must be to support the common cause. For example, an employee who
refuses to cross a picket line because of fear is not engaging in a con-
certed action."
In Mushroom Transportation Co. v. NLRB, 24 the Court of Appeals
for the Third Circuit enunciated the most expansive view ever accepted
by either the Board or a court of appeals for ascertaining whether an
activity is concerted. In the Mushroom case an employee advised his co-
workers of their rights regarding terms and conditions of employment.
In its effort to characterize this action the court made the following
analysis:
It is not questioned that a conversation may constitute a concerted
activity although it involves only a speaker and a listener, but to qual-
1301; accord, NLRB v. Union Carbide Corp., 440 F.2d 54, 55 (4th Cir.) (concerted activity
when nonstriking employees stayed home and refused to cross a picket line set up by fellow
employees), cert. denied, 404 U.S. 826 (1971); NLRB v. Difio Lab., Inc., 427 F.2d 170, 171
(6th Cir.) (unlawful to discharge two employees for honoring picket line set up by a union
of which they were not members), cert. denied, 400 U.S. 833 (1970). In Difio, the court
went so far as to say that whether the striking union did or did not want the non-union
employees to honor the picket was irrelevant as long as the employees thought such action
was in their best interest. 427 F.2d at 172.
22 Signal Oil & Gas Co. v. NLRB, 390 F.2d 338, 342-43 (9th Cir. 1968). The court here
focused not on the "preparation for group action" aspect of the statement but rather on
the fact "that it had some relation to group action in the interest of the employees." Id.
at 342-43 (emphasis added by Signal Oil court) (quoting Mushroom Transp. Co. v. NLRB,
330 F.2d 683, 685 (3d Ciri. 1964)).
Taking a different view, the Seventh Circuit held in NLRB v. Illinois Bell Tel. Co.,
189 F.2d 124 (7th Cir. 1951) that when eight employees refused to cross a picket line as a
matter of principle and not to further a cause of their own they were not engaged in
protected concerted activity. Id. at 127-28; accord, NLRB v. Rockaway News Supply Co.,
197 F.2d 111, 114-15 (2d Cir. 1952) (discharging an employee because of his refusal to cross
a picket line at a plant which his duties required him to enter was not an unfair labor
practice).
2 "One who refuses to cross a picket line by reason of physical fear does not act on
principle, He makes no common cause, and contributes nothing to mutual aid or protec-
tion in the collective bargaining process." NLRB v. Union Carbide Corp., 440 F.2d 54, 56
(4th Cir.), cert. denied, 404 U.S. 826 (1971). In Union Carbide, two employees refused to
cross a picket line as a matter of principle, a third refused out of fear of personal injury.
The court ordered the two men of principle reinstated but allowed the discharge of the
fearful one to stand. 440 F.2d at 56. The court seemed to reason that the emotion of fear
is self-centered and contrary to the spirit of concerted activity. But see Cinch Mfg. Corp.,
91 N.L.R.B. 371, 381 (1950) (refusal to cross picket line was concerted activity even though
motivated by fear).
1, 330 F.2d 683 (3d Cir. 1964).
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ify as such, it must appear at the very least that it was engaged in with
the object of initiating or inducing or preparing for group action or that
it had some relation to group action in the interest of the employees.
This is not to say that preliminary discussions are disqualified as con-
certed activities merely because they have not resulted in organized
action . . . . [I]nasmuch as almost any concerted activity for mutual
aid and protection has to start with some kind of communication be-
tween individuals, it would come very near to nullifying the rights of
organization and collective bargaining guaranteed by Section 7 of the
Act if such communications are denied protection because of lack of
fruition.2
Yet the Third Circuit held that the employee's activity was not con-
certed since its sole purpose was to provide co-workers with advice con-
cerning what each might do as an individual without involving fellow
employees or the union. 2 Since the advice therefore did not contemplate
some group action, the employee's activity was held to be merely indi-
vidual rather than concerted.
The Third Circuit's test is but one point on a spectrum, however,
since the National Labor Relations Board and the various courts of
appeals continue to devise and apply their own definitions of the term
"concerted." Several courts of appeals construe the term literally, and
find activities to be concerted only if two or more employees are in-
volved." Other courts of appeals and the Board find the activities of
even a single employee to be concerted if such activities are engaged in
for a concerted purpose.2 The seminal argument for this more expansive
2 Id. at 685.
26 Id.
2 See NLRB v. Buddies Supermarkets, Inc., 481 F.2d 714, 718-19 (5th Cir. 1973)
(employee's pressing his own individual contract demands was not concerted activity);
NLRB v. Northern Metal Co., 440 F.2d 881, 884-85 (3d Cir. 1971) (individual's claim for
holiday pay was in pursuit of private interests rather than concerted); cf. NLRB v. Dawson
Cabinet Co., 566 F.2d 1079, 1084 (8th Cir. 1977) (not concerted activity where individual
employee refused to work in protest of unequal pay between males and females).
The court in Dawson examined the Second Circuit decision of NLRB v. Interboro
Contractors, Inc., 388 F.2d 495 (2d Cir. 1967), but held it inapplicable since Interboro
dealt with enforcement of a collective bargaining agreement, an element absent in
Dawson. See 566 F.2d at 1083-84 (court declined to indicate whether it would apply
Interboro in a non-collective bargaining situation). For a more extensive discussion of the
Interboro doctrine see notes 33 through 66 and accompanying text infra.
2 See Randolph Div., Ethan Allen, Inc. v. NLRB, 513 F.2d 706, 708 (1st Cir. 1975)
(individual's inquiring about company's financing because she was worried there was no
union held concerted activity); NLRB v. Ben Pekin Corp., 452 F.2d 205, 206 (7th Cir.
1971) (allegation by a single employee of a "payoff" when he failed to get an expected raise
was protected concerted activity); NLRB v. Century Broadcasting Co., 419 F.2d 771, 780
(8th Cir. 1969) (concerted activity when sole engineer of radio station demanded overtime
[VOL. 49
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construction of the term was advanced by the Second Circuit in NLRB
v. Interboro Contractors, Inc. ,2 in which the court held that the efforts
of a single employee "to enforce the provisions of a collective bargaining
agreement may be deemed to be for concerted purposes even in the
absence of such interest by fellow employees."'' 0 This view, generally
referred to as the Interboro rule,3' has been described as constructive
concerted activity32 since the participation of other employees in the
activity is inferred from the fact that the individual activity protects the
rights of all employees.
The theory that a single employee can engage in concerted activity
if his activity also benefits other employees has been followed by the
Board even in non-union situations. In Alleluia Cushion Co.13 an em-
ployee was discharged for filing a complaint under the California Occu-
pational Safety and Health Administration. Although it was undisputed
that the employee had acted alone, the Board held that "since mini-
mum safe and healthful employment conditions for the protection and
well-being of employees have been legislatively declared to be in the
overall public interest, the consent [of fellow employees] and concert
of action emanates from the mere assertion of such statutory rights."3
The Interboro rule, however, has been specifically rejected by some
courts of appeals.3 In NLRB v. Northern Metal Co.,31 the rule was
characterized as contrary to the clear wording of the Act especially since
pay even though he acted completely on his own); cf. NLRB v. C & I Air Conditioning,
Inc., 486 F.2d 977, 978 (9th Cir. 1973) (since complaint about job site safety was not shown
to be for mutual aid and protection it was not protected activity).
2 388 F.2d 495 (2d Cir. 1967).
11 Id. at 500.
3, See generally Note, Constructive Concerted Activity and Individual Rights: The
Northern Metal-Interboro Split, 121 U. PA. L. REv. 152 (1972). For discussion of the
historical development of the concept of concerted activities see Note, The Requirement
of "Concerted" Action Under the NLRA, 53 COLUM. L. REv. 514 (1953). Since to be
protected the activity must be "for the purpose of collective bargaining or other mutual
aid or protection," it has been argued that the use of the term "concerted" is redundant.
Id. at 529. A likely effect of deleting the qualifier "concerted" would be an increase in court
decisions holding actions by individuals to be protected if they advance any element of a
collective bargaining agreement, even where the immediate purpose and benefit is solely
personal.
The Third Circuit in NLRB v. Northern Metal Co., 440 F.2d 881 (3d Cir. 1971)
labeled the Interboro rule a legal fiction, in that "[tihe Act surely does not mention
'concerted purposes'." Id. at 884 (emphasis in original).
- 221 N.L.R.B. 999 (1975).
Id. at 1000. See also Triangle Tool & Eng'r, Inc., 226 N.L.R.B. 1354, 1357 (1976)
(employee who talked to other employees about overtime wages due them was engaged in
concerted activity even though none of the others took any action).
See note 27 supra.
36 440 F.2d 881 (3d Cir. 1971).
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the Act does not on its face encompass activities engaged in by single
employees even for concerted purposes.37 The Third Circuit reasoned
that the term "concerted" only includes acts that are mutually con-
trived, planned or agreed on.38
In NLRB v. Buddies Supermarkets, Inc. ,3 the Fifth Circuit denied
enforcement of the Board's order and criticized its reliance on
Interboro."0 The court characterized a discharged employee's efforts to
obtain more favorable terms of employment for himself as individual
complaining beyond the scope of the protection afforded by section 7.11
The court found the Board's reliance on Interboro misplaced in part
because the statutory basis for the Interboro rule was, according to the
court, suspect.'" The Fifth Circuit did observe, however, that the activ-
ity of a single employee could be concerted in certain situations .
3
In non-union contexts the problems that arise from the Interboro-
Northern Metal split are compounded by the absence of a collective
bargaining agreement. Although some courts of appeals reject the
Interboro rule when no union contract is extant," those courts that
accept the rule consider as concerted activity a protest by one employee
regarding those working conditions of vital concern to other employees. 5
Moreover, unless there is evidence of disavowal by other employees, the
Board will deem such individual actions to have been impliedly con-
sented to by non-union workers." Therefore, the issue is not whether the
7 Id. at 884.
SId.
' 481 F.2d 714 (5th Cir. 1973).
0 d. at 719.
" Id. at 720.
I' d. at 719.
' Id. at 720. The court cited Signal Oil & Gas Co. v. NLRB, 390 F.2d 338, 342 (9th
Cir. 1968) (concerted activity when employee spoke in support of a threatened strike) and
NLRB v. Guernsey-Muskingum Elec. Coop., Inc., 285 F.2d 8, 12-13 (6th Cir. 1960) (em-
ployee voicing the concerns of fellow employees on their behalf).
" See NLRB v. Buddies Supermarkets, Inc., 481 F.2d 714, 719 (5th Cir. 1973)
(Interboro inapplicable outside collective bargaining context); cf. NLRB v. Dawson Cabi-
net Co., 566 F.2d 1079, 1083-84 (8th Cir. 1977) (distinguished Interboro from collective
bargaining context but failed to indicate whether Interboro rule applies in non-collective
bargaining situation).
,5 See Randolph Div., Ethan Allen, Inc. v. NLRB, 513 F.2d 706, 708-09 (1st Cir. 1975)
(concertedness requirement relates to the end rather than the means). It was noted in
Ethan Allen that if the rule was otherwise an individual who desired to institute unioniza-
tion would not be protected. "If [the employer] could so extinguish seeds, it would have
no need to uproot sprouts." Id. at 708.
," See Pink Moody, Inc., 237 N.L.R.B. No. 7, 98 L.R.R.M. 1463, 1463-64 (1978)
(employee's complaint about truck that other employees had to drive was protected); C
& I Air Conditioning, Inc., 193 N.L.R.B. 911, 911 (1971) (employee's complaint about
safety conditions is concerted activity though he acted alone); Carbet Corp., 191 N.L.R.B.
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employee is enforcing a term of the collective bargaining agreement, but
whether he is either seeking to enforce a statute enacted to protect
employees or protesting working conditions of concern to other employ-
ees.
Although the Board takes this position, not all courts agree. For
example, in Dawson Cabinet. Co.' the Board ordered reinstatement of
an employee who refused to accept a new job temporarily unless she was
paid as much as the males performing the job. 8 The Board held that
the employee, in refusing to work for less pay, was engaged in protecting
the Equal Pay Act rights of all other female employees. 9 The Eighth
Circuit, however, denied enforcement of the Board's order, holding that
the complainant had acted alone since there was no evidence that other
employees shared her concern that the employer was paying women less
for the same job than men."
In Hunt Tool Co.,5 it appeared that the Board had established the
outer boundary of its definition of "concerted." In the Hunt case, an
employee filed suit against his employer under both the Jones Act and
the Longshoreman's and Harbor Worker's Compensation Act for
892, 892 (1971) (employee's complaint about ventilation system was concerted even
though he was not officially authorized to complain for others).
The Board has stated:
[Elven individual protests are protected as concerted activity '[ijf the matter
at issue is of moment to the group of employees complaining and if the matter
is brought to the attention of management by a spokesman, voluntary or ap-
pointed for that purpose, so long as such person is speaking for the benefit of
the interested group.'
Hugh H. Wilson Corp., 171 N.L.R.B. 1040, 1046 (1968) (quoting Guernsey-Muskingum
Elec. Coop., Inc., 124 N.L.R.B. 618, 624 (1959)).
47 228 N.L.R.B. 290 (1977).
41 Id. at 293.
," Id. at 292.
0 NLRB v. Dawson Cabinet Co., 566 F.2d 1079, 1083-84 (8th Cir. 1977). In another
Board decision, the employer was held to have violated § 8(a)(1) by discharging two
employees who had attempted to obtain overtime wages to which they were entitled, and
who had also cooperated with the Department of Labor in its investigations of these
alleged violations. G.V.R., Inc., 201 N.L.R.B. 147, 147 (1973). The Board found that the
two employees had conferred on this matter and were clearly united in their determination
to obtain the wages to which they were entitled. The Board went further, however, and
held that any single employee covered by a federal statute governing wages, hours, and
conditions of employment who participates in a compliance investigation of his employer
or who protests his employer's non-compliance is engaged in protected-concerted activity
for mutual aid and protection. Id.; accord, White's Gas & Appliance, Inc., 202 N.L.R.B.
494, 495 (1973) (pursuit of overtime pay claims held concerted activity); Thurston Motor
Lines, Inc., 159 N.L.R.B. 1265, 1306-07 (1966) (contrary to public policy to remove com-
plaints to public authorities from protection of NLRA).
" 192 N.L.R.B. 145 (1971).
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damages resulting from an on-the-job injury.52 Although several
decisions have held that an employee may be engaged in protected
concerted activity when he files suit against his employer,53 if the suit
is a purely personal claim, at least under the analysis in Hunt, the
activity is individual rather than concerted. However, in its continuing
expansion of the Interboro rule, the Board has recently overruled Hunt
Tool Co. on the theory that the filing of a claim, such as the one in
Hunt, is of common interest to other employees who might be similarly
situated in the future.
54
The Board has continued to expand the Interboro rule to cover
not only situations in which an employee seeks to enforce a collective
bargaining agreement55 or a statute enacted for the benefit of em-
ployees, 5' but also to cover situations in which an employee's com-
plaints are directed toward employment conditions that are of concern
to other employees.5 7 For example, in Diagnostic Center Hospital Corp. "I
an employee had written a letter to her employer protesting the em-
ployer's failure to grant a wage increase and alleged discriminatory prac-
tices.59 The Board found that the discharged employee had been engaged
in protected concerted activity when she wrote the letter even though
she had not been designated to act for the other employees and even
though they were not informed of the letter. 0 Since evidence showed
that the other employees shared her concern and interest in the subject
matter of the letter, the employee who wrote the letter was acting con-
certedly on behalf of her fellow employees." Thus, so long as there is
" Id. at 145.
See Bunney Bros. Constr. Co., 139 N.L.R.B. 1516, 1519 (1962) (protected activity
when single employee filed a contract pay claim).
" Krispy Kreme Doughnut Corp., 245 N.L.R.B. No. 135 (1979). See Self and Cycle
Marine Distrib. Co., 237 N.L.R.B. No. 9 (1978) (relied on in Krispy Kreme).
15 New York Trap Rock Corp., 148 N.L.R.B. 374, 375 (1964) (attempts to implement
collective bargaining agreement affects all employees so it is therefore protected concerted
activity); Merlyn Bunney, 139 N.L.R.B. 1516, 1519 (1962) (single erpployee's efforts to
enforce collective bargaining contract is concerted activity).
" See Dawson Cabinet Co., 228 N.L.R.B. 290, 292 (1977). See note 50 and accompa-
nying text supra.
11 See Waco Insulation, Inc., 223 N.L.R.B. 1486, 1487 (1976) (in addition to seeking
a raise employee complained about working conditions), modified, 567 F.2d 596, 602 (4th
Cir. 1977).
228 N.L.R.B. 1215 (1977).
59 Id.
Id. at 1217.
Although the Board held that the employee's action was a concerted activity, the
discharge was upheld because the evidence failed to show that the employer knew at the
time of the employee's discharge that she had written the letter. Id. at 1216. For a discus-
sion of this knowledge requirement in the determination of "concerted activity," see text
accompanying notes 68 through 74 infra.
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evidence that the. issue in question is of common concern to other work-
ers, the affected workers need not have designated the complainant as
their spokesman in order for his activities to be deemed concerted. 2
This analysis should be contrasted with the more traditional view
of concerted activity followed by those courts of appeals that reject the
Interboro rule. 3
The mere fact that the men did not formally choose a spokesman or
that they did not go together to see Mr. Scott does not negative concert
of action. It is sufficient to constitute concerted action if from all of the
facts and circumstances in the case a reasonable inference can be
drawn that the men involved considered that they had a grievance and
decided, among themselves, that they would take it up with manage-
ment."
The positions of the Board and the anti-Interboro courts may be distin-
guished according to the degree of mobilization each requires. The
courts under consideration deem an action to be concerted only if a
reasonable inference can be drawn from the evidence that the employees
have decided to press their grievance against management. 5 On the
other hand, the Board merely requires that the matter at issue be of
common concern." In short, the Board, unlike the courts here under
discussion, does not require evidence of group mobilization. The Board
has summarized its own position in this regard as follows:
The Board has held too often to warrant citation of authority here that
where an individual employee turns to his employer alone to improve
his condition of employment and is in no sense joined in his action by
any other workman, he has not engaged in concerted activities in the
statutory sense and may be discharged with impunity.
When an individual workman demands that the employer change the
hours of work for the entire group, his success or failure affects them
all. Does it follow from this that he was acting in concert with them
and was therefore protected against discharge for such individual per-
sonal conduct? Perhaps. If. . .the rest of employees think as did the
11 See Detroit Forming Inc., 204 N.L.R.B. 205, 212 (1973) (an attempt to enlist fellow
employees in common action to better their conditions is protected concerted activity even
if others refuse to join in cause).
11 See note 27 supra.
4 NLRB v. Guernsey-Muskingum Elec. Coop., Inc., 285 F.2d 8, 12 (6th Cir. 1960).
See generally Oldham, Organized Labor, the Environment, and the Taft-Hartley Act, 71
MICH. L. REv. 935, 1003-07 (1973).
NLRB v. Guernsey-Muskingum Elec. Coop., Inc., 285 F.2d 8, 12 (6th Cir. 1960).
See Diagnostic Center Hosp. Corp., 228 N.L.R.B. 1215, 1217 (1977) (activity is
concerted if it relates to a matter of common concern).
1978]
MISSISSIPPI LA W JOURNAL
sole activist, agree with his thoughts that the employer should change
the work schedule, but whatever he does he does alone, is that activity
then to be deemed concerted and protected? Again, perhaps. Assume,
finally, that while agreeing in principle with the sole actor, the rest of
the employees make it clear they wish to disassociate themselves from
his activity, want nothing to do with it, refuse to sign his petition to
the employer, is he than engaged in statutory concerted activity?
[No.]
6 7
It must be noted, however, that yet another factor enters the equa-
tion. Even if an activity would be concerted under one or more of the
definitions that have been considered, the acting employee may not be
protected unless at the time of discipline or discharge the employer had
knowledge of the concerted nature of the activity in question., This
requirement derives from the common law doctrine that an employer
has the right to dismiss his employees at will. This right has been abro-
gated by federal labor law only to the extent that it is exercised to deter
protected concerted activities." Thus, in Standard Brands, Inc.,10 two
employees complained to various company officials about their supervi-
sor's handling of the department. Yet, since the official who actually
discharged one of the complaining employees was not aware that there
were two employees acting in concert, no violation was found by the
Board." The courts have reasoned that if the employer "from the facts
in its possession could reasonably infer that the employees in question
are engaging in unprotected activity, justice and equity require that the
employees, if they choose to remain silent, bear the risk of being dis-
charged.
'72
67 Del E. Webb Realty & Management Co., 216 N.L.R.B. 593, 593-94 (1975).
See NLRB v. Buddies Supermarkets, Inc., 481 F.2d 714, 717 (5th Cir. 1973) (record
must show employer's knowledge of concerted activity); Texas Aluminum Co. v. NLRB,
435 F.2d 917, 919 (5th Cir. 1970) (employer's knowledge of concerted activity required,
but may be inferred from circumstances); Southwest Latex Corp. v. NLRB, 426 F.2d 50,
56 (5th Cir. 1970) (discharge upheld since record reflected that employer was without
knowledge of concerted activity); Indiana Gear Works v. NLRB, 371 F.2d 273, 276-77 (7th
Cir. 1967) (employer had no knowledge that an employee's critical cartoons were concerted
activity).
66 NLRB v. Condensor Corp., 128 F.2d 67, 75 (3d Cir. 1942); see NLRB v. Jones &
Laughlin Steel Corp., 301 U.S. 1, 45 (1937) (the Act recognizes right of employer to select
employees if not motivated by intent to intimidate or coerce); NLRB v. Buddies Super-
markets, Inc., 481 F.2d 714, 721-22 n.22 (5th Cir. 1973) (upheld discharge on basis of
employee's dishonesty); NLRB v. I.V. Sutphin Co.-Atlanta, Inc., 373 F.2d 890, 893 (5th
Cir. 1967) (allowed discharge of employee who had threatened other employees).
,o 196 N.L.R.B. 1006, 1006-08 (1972).
"' Id. at 1006-08. But see NLRB v. Transport Clearings, Inc., 311 F.2d 519, 523 (5th
Cir. 1962) (knowledge of office manager imputed to general manager).
72 NLRB v. Ford Radio & Mica Corp., 258 F.2d 457, 465 (2d Cir. 1958). This reasoning
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Of course, this knowledge requirement is a double-edged sword. An
otherwise legal firing is unlawful if the employer is motivated even in
part by a belief that the employee is engaging in protected concerted
activity. Indeed, even if the employer is mistaken in his belief that the
discharged employee was engaged in protected activity, the firing is
nevertheless illegal." The issue is not whether there are independent,
legitimate grounds for the discharge, but whether the discharge was
illegally motivated.7'
As the previous discussion indicates, the determination of con-
certed status involves many factors. When the factual question of em-
ployer knowledge or belief at the time discharge is considered along with
the conflicting definitions of "concerted" promulgated by the Board and
the various courts of appeals, it becomes apparent in this context that
the formulation of a general principle of black letter law is impossible.
The determination of protected status must be approached case-by-case
and forum-by-forum. Such uncertainty, however, is detrimental to both
the workers and employers. It must be recalled that the determination
of concerted status is the threshold question upon which federal statu-
tory protection hinges. Moreover, many companies employ workers in
more than one federal appellate circuit. Simple fairness would seem to
require that a single, uniform standard be adopted. The present posture
does not mean, however, that either formal or informal notice of their purpose is required
of employees engaging in concerted activities. Id. at 465; see NLRB v. Washington Alumi-
num Co., 370 U.S. 9, 14 (1962) (employees do not necessarily lose their right to engage in
concerted activity for failure to make specific demands known).
73 See Henning & Cheadle, Inc. v. NLRB, 522 F.2d 1050, 1052-53 (7th Cir. 1975)
(question is whether activity as perceived by employer is protected); NLRB v. Garner Tool
& Die Mfg., Inc., 493 F.2d 263, 268 (8th Cir. 1974) (suspicion of protected activity is
exception to rule that employer have knowledge); NLRB v. Ritchie Mfg. Co., 354 F.2d
90, 98-99 (8th Cir. 1965) (actual participation in concerted activity is not necessary when
suspected participation motivates discharge).
", This is the generally accepted rule under Board precedent. A discharge may be
based on legitimate reasons, but if it is "partly in reprisal for protected concerted activity,
it is unlawful." Youngstown Osteopathic Hosp. Ass'n, 224 N.L.R.B. 574, 575 (1976),
enforcement denied, 574 F.2d 891, 891-92 (6th Cir. 1978) (record failed to support Board's
finding that discharge was based on participation in protected activity).
If an employee is discharged for any legitimate reason, the Act is not violated, pro-
vided that the employer does not "substitute 'good' reasons for 'real' reasons when the
purpose of the discharge is to retaliate for an employee's concerted activities." Hugh H.
Wilson Corp. v. NLRB, 414 F.2d 1345, 1352 (3d Cir. 1969), cert. denied, 397 U.S. 935
(1970); cf. Firestone Tire & Rubber Co. v. NLRB, 539 F.2d 1335, 1337 (4th Cir. 1976)
(burden of proof is on Board to show that legitimate grounds were "pretextual"). See also
NLRB v. Hanes Hosiery Div., 413 F.2d 457, 457-58 (4th Cir. 1967) (absence from work
station was pretext for discriminatory discharge); Frank Paxton Lumber Co., 235
N.L.R.B. No. 83, 98 L.R.R.M. 1072, 1073 (1978) (evidence showed that discharge for
violation of work rules was pretexual).
MISSISSIPPI LAW JOURNAL
of the law brings to mind remarks made by Samuel Johnson in another
context.
He that is thus governed, lives not by law, but by opinion; not by a
certain rule to which he can apply his intention before he acts, but by
an uncertain and variable opinion, which he can never know but after
he has committed the act on which the opinion shall be passed. He lives
by a law (if a law it be), which he can never know before he has offended
it. . . . [M]isera est servitus ubi jus est aut incognitum aut vagum. 5
II. PROPER OBJECTIVES OF PROTECTED CONCERTED ACTIVITY
Activities must be concerted to be protected, but not all concerted
activities are protected." To be protected, the concerted activity must
be engaged in for "mutual aid and protection." This phrase has been
broadly construed and generally deemed to include any activity the
purpose of which is to affect the well-being of a group of employees.
7
Usually the objectives of the activity must relate in some way to terms
and conditions of employment.78 Protests regarding matters only indi-
rectly related to working conditions will not be protected absent some
significant nexus with employment relationship. In G & W Electric
Specialty Co. v. NLRB,7 1 an employee who sought support for a petition
during working hours and on company premises was discharged for vio-
lating a company rule against solicitation. 0 The petition criticized the
5 J. Bosw.LL, Lnx OF JOHNSON 497 (W. Chapman ed. 1970) (it is miserable to serve
when rights are unknown or vague).
1, NLRB v. Superior Tool & Die Co., 309 F.2d 692, 695 (6th Cir. 1962); see NLRB v.
Fansteel Metallurgical Corp., 306 U.S. 240, 255-56 (1939) (to be protected, concerted
conduct must be lawful); Shelly & Anderson Furn. Mfg. Co. v. NLRB, 497 F.2d 1200, 1203
(9th Cir. 1974) (to be protected, conduct must: (1) be work related, (2) further group
interest, (3) seek specific remedy, and (4) be lawful); Hagopian & Sons, Inc. v. NLRB,
395 F.2d 947, 951 (6th Cir. 1968) (to be protected, concerted activity must concern con-
ditions of employment).
11 See Henning & Cheadle, Inc. v. NLRB, 522 F.2d 1050, 1054 (7th Cir. 1975) (activity
regarding discharge of supervisory employee is protected); NLRB v. Guernsey-
Muskingum Elec. Coop., Inc., 285 F.2d 8, 12 (6th Cir. 1960) (appointment of a foreman
was proper subject for concerted activity). See generally Note, Constructive Concerted
Activity and Individual Rights: The Northern Metal-Interboro Split, 121 U. PA. L. REv.
152, 161 (1972).
11 Compare G & W Elec. Specialty Co., 360 F.2d 873, 876 (7th Cir. 1966) (employ-
ees' credit union activities where employer was in no way involved were deemed not to be
for mutual aid or protection) with Eastex, Inc. v. NLRB, 98 S. Ct. 2505, 2512-13 (1978)
(employees' newsletter advocating certain legislative action deemed protected activity)
and Kaiser Eng'rs v. NLRB, 538 F.2d 1379, 1384-85 (9th Cir. 1976) (employees' lobbying
legislators regarding national immigration was protected). See generally Getman, supra
note 3, at 1218.




operation of a credit union created and operated by the employees. The
petition did not request corrective action from the employer; indeed, the
matter was not even subject to the employer's control." In denying
enforcement of the Board's order the Seventh Circuit held that the
Board's finding that such activities were for mutual aid and protection
was contrary to the intent of the Act and went beyond the Act's concern
with labor-management relations. 2
Yet, confronted with similar facts, the Ninth Circuit in Kaiser En-
gineers v. NLRB1 found the activity to be concerted and within the
protection of section 7. In Kaiser, the employees, civil engineers, sent a
letter to Congress opposing changes in the immigration laws that would
have permitted the importation of alien engineers. Kaiser considered
the letter to be an embarrassment to the company and discharged the
worker who had drafted it. Although federal immigration policy is
clearly outside the control of management, 84 the court held that the issue
was closely related to the employment security of the engineers. For this
reason, the situation in Kaiser was deemed distinguishable from that in
G & W Electric Specialty Co. In that case the circulated petition dealt
with the status of employees as depositors in a credit union; in Kaiser,
the controversial letter related to the status of the engineers as employ-
ees.8 Thus, section 7 protection can extend to matters beyond the con-
trol of management."
Similarly, participation in sympathy strikes,8 refusals to cross
picket lines"8 and other acts in support of fellow employees or union
" Id. at 876.
52 Id. at 876-77. For criticism of this rationale see Getman, supra note 3, at 1218-22.
538 F.2d 1379 (9th Cir. 1976).
Id. at 1385.
SId.
'e Illustrative of this principle is Bethlehem Shipbldg. Corp. v. NLRB, 114 F.2d 930
(1st Cir. 1940), in which employees' endorsing a change in workmen's compensation laws
in opposition to the position of the employer was protected. Id. at 941; accord, Eastex,
Inc. v. NLRB, 98 S. Ct. 2505, 2512-13 (1978) (distribution of newsletter opposing incorpo-
ration of right-to-work provision into state constitution was protected).
87 See NLRB v. C.K. Smith & Co., 569 F.2d 162, 165 (1st Cir. 1977) (sympathy strike
by employees against common employer is protected), cert. denied, 98 S. Ct. 3070 (1978);
Newspaper Prod. Co. v. NLRB, 503 F.2d 821, 830 (5th Cir. 1974) (sympathy strikers
entitled to same protection as actual strikers).
n NLRB v. Union Carbide Corp., 440 F.2d 54, 55-56 (4th Cir.) (employees refusing
to cross picket line as matter of principle are protected), cert. denied, 404 U.S. 826 (1971);
NLRB v. Difio Lab., Inc., 427 F.2d 170, 171-72 (6th Cir.) (employer has no right to require
nonstriking employees to cross picket line), cert. denied, 400 U.S. 833 (1970); NLRB v.
Southern Greyhound Lines, 426 F.2d 1299, 1301 (5th Cir. 1970) (employee refusing to cross
picket line becomes "striker" himself and is thereby protected). See generally Atleson,
Threats to Health and Safety: Employee Self-Help Under the NLRA, 59 MINN. L. REv.
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members"' have traditionally been regarded as protected concerted ac-
tivities despite the fact that they involve matters outside the participat-
ing employee's own relationship with his employer. Perhaps the best
justification for the protection of such activities is that, although the
dispute does not immediately concern the employee, the employee
knows that by supporting the strike or honoring the picket line he is
assuring himself of the reciprocal support of those whom he is helping
if and when he becomes the primary striker. "[Tihe solidarity so estab-
lished is 'mutual aid' in the most literal sense, as nobody doubts.",",
Myriad other objectives have been held to be proper goals of pro-
tected concerted activity. One of the most common is protest over the
safety of working conditions. Violations of section 8(a)(1) have been
found in situations in which the employer had disciplined or discharged
employees for refusing to work under conditions they believed to be
dangerous." In addition, employees' refusal to work with defective
647, 698-99 (1975); Connolly, Section 7 and Sympathy Strikes: The Respective Rights of
Employers and Employees, 25 LAB. L.J. 760, 762-63 (1974); Smith, The Supreme Court,
Boys Market Labor Injunctions, and Sympathy Work Stoppages, 44 U. Cm. L. REV. 321,
352 (1977).
11 See General Tire & Rubber Co. v. NLRB, 451 F.2d 257, 259 (lst Cir. 1971) (em-
ployee who crossed picket line but refused to do "struck work" was protected); NLRB v.
Peter Cailler Kohler Swiss Chocolate Co., 130 F.2d 503, 505-06 (2d Cir. 1942) (resolution
protecting employer's action against another strike was protected); Fort Wayne Corru-
gated Paper Co. v. NLRB, 111 F.2d 869, 874 (7th Cir. 1940) (employee's union activities
outside scope of his employment relationship protected). See generally Newborn,
Restrictions on the Right to Strike on the Railroads: A History and Analysis (II), 24 LAB.
L.J. 234, 248 (1973); Oldham, supra note 64, at 1004.
," NLRB v. Peter Cailler Kohler Swiss Chocolate Co., 130 F.2d 503, 505-06 (2d Cir.
1942).
11 See Elam v. NLRB, 395 F.2d 611, 614 (D.C. Cir. 1968) (work stoppage by mailboys
in mailroom of newspaper in protest of lack of safety devices on machines protected);
Morrison-Knudsen Co. v. NLRB, 358 F.2d 411, 413 (9th Cir. 1966) (action of employee
complaining about lack of safety goggles and other poor working conditions protected even
though complaining employee was not subjected to those conditions); NLRB v. Belfry
Coal Corp., 331 F.2d 738, 740 (6th Cir. 1964) (refusal of two employees to work in area of
mine declared unsafe by state board protected); Modern Carpet Indus., Inc., 236 N.L.R.B.
No. 132 (1978) (refusal to work with lead that had been stored with radioactive material
protected); Du Tri Displays, Inc., 231 N.L.R.B. No. 128 (1978) (protests over excessive
chemical fumes protected). Contra, United States Steel Corp. v. United Mine Workers,
393 F. Supp. 942, 948 (W.D. Penn. 1975) (men in mine cannot refuse to go to work simply
because they feel some safety hazard involved). At least one court has even allowed
employees to protest future dangerous conditions. See Bob's Casing Crews, Inc. v. NLRB,
458 F.2d 1301, 1304 (5th Cir. 1972) (action of employee in informing employer that crew
hired to lay down casing wanted relief crew to pick up drill pipe because they would be
too tired to do it safely was protected even though protest concerned future conditions
instead of current ones).
The courts and the Board have also been active in protecting conduct which protests
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equipment has usually been held to be protected.2 Employees may not
be safe from discharge or discipline if the protests regard risks inherent
in the nature of the job since such protests essentially amount to a
protest against the job itself." This analysis is not applicable, however,
conditions that are merely unpleasant as opposed to dangerous. See NLRB v. Washington
Aluminum Co., 370 U.S. 9, 15-16 (1962) (walkout by employees because shop was too cold
to work in protected as concerted activity despite fact that employer had made a good
faith effort to raise temperature in machine shop); NLRB v. Elias Bros. Restaurant, 496
F.2d 1165, 1166-67 (6th Cir. 1974) (protest by waitresses that work area was too hot, floor
was wet, and lack of spoons protected); NLRB v. Okla-Inn, 488 F.2d 498, 503 (10th Cir.
1973) (court upheld walkout of maids caused by generally poor working conditions);
NLRB v. KDI Precision Prods. Inc., 436 F.2d 385, 386-87 (6th Cir. 1971) (ultimatum of
"fans or walkout" protected in protest over hot working conditions); NLRB v. Southern
Silk Mills, 209 F.2d 155, 155 (1953) (spontaneous walkouts by employees in protest of
excessive heat protected); Rockford Newspapers, Inc., 229 N.L.R.B. 429, 433 (1978) (dis-
charge because of complaints about drafts in working area violates NLRA); Interlake,
Inc., 218 N.L.R.B. 1043, 1049 (1975) (although work in furnace duct was normally hot and
dirty, where heat was unbearable refusal to work was protected).
92 See Elam v. NLRB, 395 F.2d 611, 614 (D.C.. Cir. 1968) (refusal of mailboys to work
on unsafe machine protected); Pink Moody, Inc., 237 N.L.R.B. No. 7 (1978) (refusal to
drive truck with defective brakes may not be disciplined); Essex Int'l, Inc., 213 N.L.R.B.
260, 265-66 (1974) (employees may not be disciplined for refusing to work on broken
machine made temporarily operable by employer).
In addition to these cases, there are other sources of protection for employees' refusing
to work in unsafe conditions. Section 502 of the Taft-Hartley Act states "the quitting of
labor by an employee or employees in good faith because of abnormally dangerous condi-
tions for work at the place of employment of such employee or employees [shall not] be
deemed a strike under this chapter." 29 U.S.C. § 143 (1976). Although this statute can
be important in a non-union context, it is invaluable in an organized plant since the
bargaining agreement may contain a "no-strike" clause. See NLRB v. Knight Moreley
Corp., 251 F.2d 753, 759 (6th Cir. 1958) (walkout in protest of abnormally dangerous
condition does not violate no-strike clause in labor contract). The employee also may turn
to appropriate provisions of the Occupational Safety and Health Act of 1970, which allow
the employee to complain to the Occupational Safety and Health Administration that the
working conditions are unsafe. See Occupational Safety and Health Act of 1970, 84 Stat.
1590 (codified in scattered sections of 5, 15, 18, 29, 42, 49 U.S.C.). However, where the
employee is confronted with a hazardous working condition that could result in death or
serious injury, the employee may refuse to work until the condition is corrected and be
protected in his refusal even though he failed to pursue the normal OSHA procedures. 29
C.F.R. § 1977.12(b)(2) (1977). See also Note, Imminent Danger: A Gap in Occupational
Safety and Health Protection, 5 Omo N.U.L. REv. 479 (1978).
" See Reed v. NLRB, 430 F.2d 331, 333-34 (10th Cir. 1970) (employee walkout in
protest of dangers encountered during winter logging in Wyoming unprotected because
inclement conditions were inherent aspect of job); United States Steel Corp. v. United
Mine Workers, 393 F. Supp. 942, 948 (W.D. Penn. 1975) (men in mine cannot refuse to
work just because a safety hazard is involved); Mal Landfill Corp., 210 N.L.R.B. 167, 170-
72 (1974) (since operation of a landfill inherently involves the risk of fire, where employer
has complied with all federal and state standards any employee protest over fire hazards
is unprotected).
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when the inherent risks of the job are greatly increased by outside influ-
ences such as occasional inclement weather. 4 As when the job is inher-
ently dangerous, the employees are considered to have assumed the risks
involved and only those protests which are against an increase in the
level of danger are protected. 5
An area that is often related to safety protests is the filing of a
complaint with a third party against the employer for safety violations.
For instance, it may be unlawful to discharge or discipline an employee
who threatens to file a complaint with the federal Occupational Safety
& Health Administration." As noted above in the discussion of con-
certed activity, whether such conduct by an employee acting alone is
protected may depend on the forum one is in and the circuit in which
one is located." Nonetheless, an employee's efforts to enforce an em-
ployer's statutory duties relating to safety have been protected when the
employee filed complaints with various governmental agencies.9
The filing of a complaint in an attempt to force the employer to
comply with other statutory responsibilities has also been protected9
" See Union Boiler Co., 213 N.L.R.B. 818, 820-22 (1974) (refusal of employees to work
overtime because rainy weather had reduced visibility and greatly increased danger of
slipping while cleaning inside of silo protected); American Homes Systems, 200 N.L.R.B.
1151, 1155 (1972) (refusal of carpenters to work outside in sub-zero weather protected).
"5 Compare Interlake, Inc., 218 N.L.R.B. 1043, 1049 (1975) (although work in furnace
duct was normally hot, where duct was so hot normal equipment was ineffective, employ-
ees are protected in refusing to work) with Mal Landfill Corp., 210 N.L.R.B. 167, 170-72
(1974) (since operation of a landfill inherently involves risk of fire, employees may not
protest presence of fire hazards).
" 29 U.S.C. § 660(c)(1) (1976); 29 C.F.R. § 1977.12 (1977).
See notes 27 through 43 and accompanying text supra. See also Cloke, Concerted
Activity and the National Labor Policy, 5 SAN FERN. U.L. REv. 289 (1976).
" See Socony Mobil Oil Co. v. NLRB, 357 F.2d 662, 663-64 (2d Cir. 1966) (employer
may not discipline or discharge an employee who filed a complaint with the appropriate
governmental agency with regard to the unsafe operation of a vessel); Walls Mfg. Co. v.
NLRB, 321 F.2d 753, 754 (D.C. Cir.) (employee's action in sending a letter to state
department of health informing the agency of the unsanitary conditions at employer's
premises protected), cert. denied, 375 U.S. 923 (1963); B & P Motor Express, 230 N.L.R.B.
653, 655 (1977) (employee who filed safety complaint with Departnment of Transportation
may not be disciplined); GTE Lenkurt, Inc., 215 N.L.R.B. 190,199 (1974) (employee may
file safety complaint with OSHA without being subject to discharge); Detroit Forming,
Inc., 204 N.L.R.B. 205, 212-13 (1973) (employee who files complaint with the local health
department is safe from discharge).
" See Rockford Newspapers, Inc., 229 N.L.R.B. 429, 431 (1978) (filing sex discrimina-
tion charge with EEOC is a protected concerted activity); King Soopers, Inc., '22
N.L.R.B. 1011, 1018 (1976) (filing of race discrimination charge with EEOC protected);
G.V.R., Inc., 201 N.L.R.B. 147, 152-53 (1973) (filing charge with Department of Labor
with regard to employer's requirement of kickbacks from employees does not subject
employee to discharge); Advance Carbon Prod., Inc., 198 N.L.R.B. 741, 747-48 (1972)
(employee who filed race discrimination charge with Fair Employment Practices Commis-
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under the theory that the complaint was filed for the mutual aid and
protection of all employees. 00 In fact, this reasoning has been used
to protect from discharge an employee who filed suit against the em-
ployer to collect wages wrongfully withheld by the employer,' 0' as well
as other wage-related protests.02 Employees may also lawfully protest
a change in either the pay system'03 or the output requirements of a
sion may not be discharged or refused rehiring on that basis). Contra, NLRB v. Dawson
Cabinet Co., 566 F.2d 1079, 1082-83 (8th Cir. 1977) (discharge of female employee who
filed wage complaint based on sex discrimination with Hour and Wage Division of Depart-
ment of Labor did not violate NLRA rights of employee because action by one person is
not "concerted activity").
It is beyond the scope of this Article to discuss the statutory provisions with which
the above cases are concerned. However, it should be noted that some of these statutes
provide remedies for retaliation in addition to those set up by the case law surrounding
the NLRA. Therefore, even if an employer is held not to be in violation of the National
Labor Relations Act for discharging an employee who has filed an EEOC discrimination
charge, he would be in violation of the retaliation prohibition found in Title VII. See 42
U.S.C. § 2000e-3(a) (1976). See also Emporium Capwell Co. v. Western Addition Comm.
Organization, 420 U.S. 55, 71-72 (1975).
11 Alleluia Cushion Co., 221 N.L.R.B. 999, 999-1001 (1975) (where one employee
seeks to enforce an employer's statutory duties, the activity will be deemed concerted).
This appears to be the Board's viewpoint at the present time. The courts, however, are
less likely to accept this argument. See NLRB v. Dawson Cabinet Co., 566 F.2d 1079, 1082-
84 (8th Cir. 1977) and cases cited therein.
101 See Auto Club, 231 N.L.R.B. No. 99 (1977) (filing suit to collect commissions
wrongfully withheld protected); Ambulance Serv. of New Bedford, Inc., 229 N.L.R.B. 106,
109-10 (1977) (employee who filed criminal complaint against employer who continuously
dishonored paychecks is protected from discharge); Trinity Trucking & Materials Corp.,
221 N.L.R.B. 364, 364-66 (1975) (recognizing fact that discharge of employee solely be-
cause he filed a civil suit to collect on dishonored paychecks may be unfair labor practice),
supplemented, 227 N.L.R.B. 792 (1977). Despite this rule, the Board has expressly stated
that an employee is not protected in filing a civil suit against the employer for recovery
of personal injury damages. See Hunt Tool Co., 192 N.L.R.B. 145, 146 (1971) (upholding
discharge of employee who filed personal injury suit under Jones Act).
'" See Community Hosp. of Roanoke Valley, Inc. v. NLRB, 538 F.2d 607, 609-10 (4th
Cir. 1976) (employees' actions in writing letter to newspaper and appearing on television
with regard to low salary of nurses protected); Fairmont Hotel Co., 230 N.L.R.B. 874, 878
(1977) (protests over tipping arrangements held to be protected); Pacific Pollution Con-
trol, Inc., 227 N.L.R.B. 293, 296-97 (1977) (protests made to boss by employees when they
had not been paid or reimbursed for expenses held protected); Hamlet Steak House, Inc.,
197 N.L.R.B. 632, 635 (1972) (waitresses who protest tipping arrangement are engaged in
protected activity).
" Hale Mfg. Co., 228 N.L.R.B. 10, 12-13 (1977) (employees' request that plant drop
bonus plan in favor of straight hourly wages protected); Empire Gas, Inc., 224 N.L.R.B.
628, 629-30 (1976) (protest letter that argued against company's new bonus plan and for
old commission arrangement held protected activity); Rinkie Pontiac Co., 216 N.L.R.B.
239, 242 (1975) (prdtesting of car dealer's implementation of a new insurance program with
incentive pay features held protected); Blue Star Knitting, Inc., 216 N.L.R.B. 312, 316
(1975) (employees who protested piecework rates cannot be disciplined); Browning Indus.
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job, "" as well as any order to work what they consider to be excessive
overtime. 0 5 However, if an employer refuses to perform overtime work
his action is protected only if his status is that of a striker. Thus, in such
a situation, he may not continue to work his regular hours.' 8
Protests of the discharge of a fellow employee have been held to be
proper objectives of protected concerted activity.'"7 On the other hand,
employees have only a limited right to protest the discharge of a supervi-
sor'"' or management's selection of a new supervisor. '" Only if the super-
Venetian Marble, 213 N.L.R.B. 269, 272 (1974) (questioning of new piecework system held
protected activity).
104 See Digital Equip. Corp., 226 N.L.R.B. 1278, 1283 (1976) (invalidated discharge
of employee who considered a production quota to be unfair); American Motors Corp., 214
N.L.R.B. 455, 462 (1974) (efforts to discourage the wearing of "Fight Speed Up" T-shirts
held to interfere with protected activity).
'" See Ford Motor Co., 221 N.L.R.B. 663, 668 (1975) (employees may not be dis-
charged for protesting employer's overtime policy); Imperial Bedding Co., 216 N.L.R.B.
934, 938 (1975) (same); Barkus Bakery, Inc., 214 N.L.R.B. 478, 481 (1974). But see C.G.
Conn, Ltd. v. NLRB, 108 F.2d 390, 396 (7th Cir. 1939) (discharge of employees unilaterally
attempting to set out conditions concerning overtime held not violative of NLRA).
' First Nat'l Bank v. NLRB, 413 F.2d 921, 925 (8th Cir. 1969); see NLRB v. John
S. Swift Co., 277 F.2d 641, 646 (7th Cir. 1960) (discharge of employees who refused to work
overtime held lawful under NLRA).
"07 See United Merchants & Mfr., Inc. v. NLRB, 554 F.2d 1276, 1278 (4th Cir. 1977)
(concerted work stoppage by unrepresented employees in protest of discharge of fellow
employees is protected); NLRB v. Imperial Bedding Co., 519 F.2d 1073, 1075 (5th Cir.
1975) (a strike in protest of the suspension of fellow employee is protected); Pepsi Cola
Bottling Co., 449 F.2d 824, 829-30 (5th Cir.) (refusal to work or leave plant until reinstate-
ment of employees held not so illegal as to warrant discharge), cert. denied, 407 U.S. 910
(1971); Howard Mfg. Co., 227 N.L.R.B. 1858, 1866 (1977) (picketing plant in protest of
supervisor's discharge is protected); Eagle Int'l, Inc., 221 N.L.R.B. 1291, 1298 (1975)
(discharge and refusal to reinstate employees protesting discharge of fellow employees is
an unfair labor practice). But see Cone Mills Corp. v. NLRB, 413 F.2d 445, 454 (4th Cir.
1969) (eight employees stopping work to protest discharge of fellow employee not protected
because of rebellious attitude and infringement of employer's rights).
' Section 2(11) of the NLRA defines a supervisor as:
[Any individual having authority, in the interest of the employer, to hire,
transfer, suspend, lay off, recall, pkomote, discharge, assign, reward, or disci-
pline other employees, or responsibly to direct them, or to adjust their griev-
ances, or effectively to recommend such action, if in connection with the forego-
ing the exercise of such authority is not of a merely routine or clerical nature,
but requires use of independent judgment.
29 U.S.C. § 152(11) (1976). Compare Great W. Sugar Co., 137 N.L.R.B. 551, 556-57 (1962)
(staff with both supervisory and rank-and-file activities not considered supervisors) with
Whitmeyer Lab., Inc., 114 N.L.R.B. 749, 751 (1955) (contrary holding). The trend in later
cases has been to allow the supervisor to retain rank-and-file status with regard to union
membership and bargaining powers. See Gaf Corp. v. NLRB, 524 F.2d 492, 497 (5th Cir.
1975) (rank-and-file machinist who was acting maintenance supervisor and in line for
promotion not a supervisor under Act); Westinghouse Elec. Corp. v. NLRB, 424 F.2d 1151,
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visor's responsiblities are related to the employee's own employment
does even a limited right exist to attack the managerial decision.',
Although their power to protest the selection of a supervisor is narrowly
circumscribed, employees are usually protected in activities that protest
the improper conduct of a supervisor. In Leslie Metal Arts Co."' the
employees complained that a supervisor failed to take disciplinary mea-
sures against an employee who was misbehaving on the job. The Board
held that since supervisors are responsible for maintaining proper work-
ing conditions, an employee's protest of a failure to satisfy this duty was
protected."' Similarly, employees may within the protection of section
7 object to a supervisor's rude manner of directing the department."'
However, a protest of a supervisor's policies is not protected if it is made
in bad faith to undermine the supervisor's authority with the intent to
1158 (7th Cir.) (lead engineer does not possess enough managerial powers to be supervi-
sor), cert. denied, 400 U.S. 831 (1971). But see E.I. DuPont De Nemours & Co., 210
N.L.R.B. 395, 397 (1974) (foremen promoted to supervise a new but temporary depart-
mental plant ineligible to vote as employees even though told that their tenure was
temporary).
'0 It should be noted that protests concerning either the hiring or discharging of
supervisors are generally unprotected. See NLRB v. Crimptex, Inc., 517 F.2d 501, 504 n.5
(1st Cir. 1975) (strike is unprotected if its purpose is to obtain the removal of a supervisor);
American Art Clay Co. v. NLRB, 328 F.2d 88, 91 (7th Cir. 1964) (walkout by employees
after announcement of change to foreman held not protected under the Act); Cleaver-
Brooks Mfg. Corp. v. NLRB, 264 F.2d 637, 641 (7th Cir.) (discharge of four employees'
protesting appointment of a new foreman was lawful), cert. denied, 361 U.S. 817 (1959);
NLRB v. Reynolds Int'l Pen Co., 162 F.2d 680, 684 (7th Cir. 1947) (employee's action in
protesting the demotion of a foreman is not concerted activity). Contra, Howard Mfg. Co., .
227 N.L.R.B. 1858, 1866 (1977) (picketing plant in protest of supervisor's discharge is
protected); see Magna Visual v. NLRB, 516 F.2d 876, 877 (8th Cir. 1975) (employees'
protesting the promotion of an unpopular co-employee to supervisor protected); NLRB v.
Phoenix Mut. Life Ins. Co., 167 F.2d 983, 988 (7th Cir.) (discharge of employee who
drafted letter to employer concerning the selection of a cashier held unlawful), cert.
denied, 335 U.S. 845 (1948).
"I Courts have inferred that employee protests concerning supervisory positions are
protected if the identity of that supervisor has an unusually direct impact upon the
employees' duties. See Dobbs Houses v. NLRB, 325 F.2d 531, 538 (5th Cir. 1963) (dis-
charge of supervisor who was sympathetic buffer for employees was legitimate concern);
Kelso Marine, Inc., 199 N.L.R.B. 7, 13 (1972) (employees had legitimate interest in the
discharge of supervisor since it had impact upon their working conditions); Plastilite
Corp., 153 N.L.R.B. 180, 182 (1965) (if supervisor's identity has impact on employees' job
interests conditions of employment are involved), modified, 375 F.2d 343 (8th Cir. 1967);
Guernsey-Muskingum Elec. Coop., Inc., 124 N.L.R.B. 618, 623 (1959) (hiring of newcomer
as foreman related to mutual aid and protection of employees), enforced, 285 F.2d 8 (6th
Cir. 1960). See notes 197 through 199 and accompanying text infra.
208 N.L.R.B. 323 (1974).
li Id. at 326.
,, See K-Mart Enterprises, Inc., 202 N.L.R.B. 358, 364 (1973) (employee's complain-
ing about supervisor's yelling and screaming held a protected activity).
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* have him removed in favor of a more lenient supervisor."'
As a general rule, when the object of employee protest is a discre-
tionary act of management, the means of protest that will be protected
are relatively restricted. Thus, while a walkout might be an appropriate
response to unsafe working conditions, "' a grievance meeting might be
the only protected response to management's selection of supervisory
personnel deemed undesirable by the workers."6 This doctrine, although
far from absolute, is apparently based on the theory that management,
in order properly to perform its managerial functions, must be free from
the threat of employee economic reprisals against the exercise by man-
agement of its discretion in traditional areas of managerial perogative." 7
It should be noted that this view is corollary with the view taken by the
courts of employee protest of matters beyond the control of manage-
ment."' Issues over which management has no control are like issues
over which management historically has had exclusive control"9 in that
neither is directly within the recognized sphere of negotiable employer-
employee relations. Therefore, the courts, while not entirely prohibiting
concerted activity in these areas, will in both instances strictly scruti-
nize the methods of protest.'2
"' See NLRB v. Red Top, Inc., 455 F.2d 721, 728 (8th Cir. 1972) (attempting to
replace manager for improper motives is not protected); Socony Mobil Oil Co. v. NLRB,
357 F.2d 662, 664 (2d Cir. 1966) (if complaint is filed in bad faith it is not protected
activity); cf. Walls Mfg. Co. v. NLRB, 321 F.2d 753, 754 (D.C. Cir. 1963) (letter to
sanitation commission protected activity since no intent to maliciously injure the em-
ployer).
"I See St. Louis Bagel Bakers, Inc., 224 N.L.R.B. 307, 313 (1976) (walkout by employ-
ees refusing to operate a defective machine held protected activity).
"I For a guide on grievance procedure see B. CRANE & R. HoFFMAN, SUCCESSFUL
HANDLING OF LABOR GRiEvANcEs (1965).
"1 See* Getman, supra note 3, at 1211-18.
118 See G & W Elec. Specialty Co. v. NLRB, 360 F.2d 873, 876 (7th Cir. 1976) (em-
ployee credit union not a matter over which the company had control; nevertheless,
discharge of employee who was complaining about credit union held lawful).
"I See notes 108 through 114 and accompanying text supra.
11 As long as the purpose of the concerted activity is a proper one, "the wisdom of a
concerted activity, or the lack of justification therefore is irrelevant to the determination
of its status as protected." NLRB v. Mackay Radio & Tel. Co., 304 U.S. 333, 344 (1938).
For example, in NLRB v. Washington Aluminum Co., 370 U.S. 9 (1962), the fact that the
heater in the plant was being repaired was irrelevant to whether the walkout to protest
the extreme cold was protected. Id. at 17-19. Therefore, as long as the objective of the
employees can be termed for mutual aid or protection, it is a proper subject for protected
concerted activity without regard to the good faith actions of the employer. See generally
Lopatka, Protection Under the National Labor Relations Act and Title VII of the Civil
Rights Act for Employees Who Protest Discrimination in Private Employment, 50
N.Y.U.L. Rev. 1179, 1184-95 (1975).
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III. TYPES OF CONCERTED ACTIVITIES WHICH ARE PROTECTED
The collective bargaining agreement of unionized employees
usually defines how grievances are to be presented, and by-passing the
established procedures for grievance can result in the loss of section 7
protection for concerted activities that would have been protected other-
wise. This principle is vividly illustrated in Emporium Capwell Co. v.
Western Addition Community Organization. '" In that case, the Su-
preme Court denied the protection of the National Labor Relations Act
to racial protests by minority employees who had by-passed the union
grievance procedures. 2 2 Although the collective bargaining agreement
prohibited racial discrimination, it also established a mechanism for the
presentation of complaints. 23 The Court held that the activities were not
protected under section 7 because the Act prohibits employees from
circumventing use of their elected representative in an attempt to en-
gage in direct bargaining with the employer.
24
For non-union employees, protected concerted activity generally
.does not involve an extended use of economic pressure such as a lengthy
strike, but, rather, tends to be "a show of feelings rather than an effort
to engage in economic combat.' ' '2 Yet, theoretically, because of the
absence of a collective bargaining agreement and a representative to
speak for them, employees in a non-union plant have more freedom to
choose the means of presenting grievances to their employer. In NLRB
v. Washington Aluminum Co.,' 26 the employees of a non-union plant
staged a walkout to protest the lack of heat in the plant. 27 The Supreme
Court determined that since the employees had no bargaining represen-
tative and no established grievance procedure, they were forced to pre-
sent their grievance through the best means available. 28 Nevertheless,
not all such activities are protected. In Washington Aluminum, the
121 420 U.S. 50 (1975). See generally Cantor, Dissident Worker Action, After the
Emporium, 29 RuT. L. REV. 35 (1975); Cassel, The Emporium Case: Title VII Rights and
the Collective Bargaining Process, 26 HASTINGS L.J. 1347 (1975); 87 HARv. L. REV. 656
(1974); 54 N.C.L. REV. 721 (1976); 27 VAND. L. REV. 201 (1974).
1" 420 U.S. at 70.
'2 Id. at 53.
12, Id. at 70; accord, NLRB v. Tanner Motor Livery, Ltd., 419 F.2d 216, 218 (9th Cir.
1969 ! (two employees who went on strike without first going through union grievance pro-
cedures not protected); Brown v. Sterling Aluminum Prods. Corp., 365 F.2d 651, 656-57
(8th Cir. 1966) (relocation of plant affects union as a whole and only union has right to
negotiate); NLRB v. Draper Corp., 145 F.2d 199, 202-03 (4th Cir. 1944) (wildcat strikers
not protected when union is carrying on negotiations).
'2 Getman, supra note 3, at 1197.
126 370 U.S. 9 (1962).
I ld. at 11-12.
1 Id. at 14.
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Court condoned the walkout only because it was not unreasonable,
"unlawful, violent or in breach of contract,"''2 nor was it
"indefensible".130
In addition, of course, the activity must also satisfy the definition
of "concerted"' 131 and be for the purpose of mutual aid or protection"2
to be entitled to protection. Despite these restrictions, the courts and
the Board have held many different types of activity in a non-union
context to be protected. Examples include circulating and presenting
petitions,13 writing letters to the employer'u or to fellow employees,"5
displaying leaflets in the plant, " picketing,'37 arranging and assuming
leadership roles at meetings to present grievances, 31 individual and
group presentation of grievances, 3' strikes and other work stoppages,''
forming grievance committees,"' lobbying before the legislature on mat-
ters relating to employment,"2 appearing on television to protest em-
"2 Id. at 17.
in Id.
"' See section II supra.
132 See section III supra.
"3 See Owens-Coming Fiberglass Corp. v. NLRB, 407 F.2d 1357, 1365 (4th Cir. 1969)
(circulating of and obtaining signatures on petition to correct what employees thought to
be inadequacy of working conditions held protected activity); Frank v. Paxton Lumber
Co., 235 N.L.R.B. No. 83, 98 L.R.R.M. 1072, 1072 (1978) (employee protected when he
presented list of changes in working conditions desired by others to manager); Youngstown
Osteopathic Hosp. Ass'n, 224 N.L.R.B. 574, 575-76 (1976) (employee protected for drafting
petition protesting the discharge of a co-worker).
'u See Diagnostic Center Hosp. Corp., 228 N.L.R.B. 1215, 1217 (1977) (employee
protected when he wrote letter to board of directors protesting wages).
In See Empire Gas, Inc., 224 N.L.R.B. 628, 630-31 (1976) (employee's writing letter
to co-employees protesting elimination of pay system and urging work stoppages held
protected conduct).
I" See International Ass'n of Machinists v. NLRB, 415 F.2d 113, 115 (8th Cir. 1969)
(invalidated prohibition of distribution of leaflets in non-working area during off time).
III See, e.g., NLRB v. Babcock & Wilcox Co., 498 F.2d 43, 48 (3d Cir. 1974) (peaceful
picketing held protected activity); Artware, Inc., 198 F.2d 637, 642 (6th Cir.) (right to
strike includes peaceful picketing regardless of resulting damage to employer's business),
cert. denied, 344 U.S. 897 (1952).
131 See Frank Paxton Lumber Co., 235 N.L.R.B. No. 83, 98 L.R.R.M. 1072, 1072-73
(1978) (employee had group of employees over to his house to prepare a list of grievances).
I See Hugh H. Wilson Corp. v. NLRB, 414 F.2d 1345, 1354 (3d Cir. 1969) (protected
activity when two employees presented grievance to management concerning latter's fail-
ure to contribute to profit sharing plan).
14 See NLRB v. Washington Aluminum Co., 370 U.S. 9, 15 (1962) (employees pro-
tected when they walked off job because of cold working conditions); NLRB v. Lasaponara
& Sons, Inc., 541 F.2d 992, 998 (2d Cir. 1976) (work stoppage to protest having to work
on Palm Sunday protected activity).
"I See Columbia Univ., 236 N.L.R.B. No. 84 (1978) (protected activity when em-
ployee formed grievance committee to protest unfair policies).
"I2 See Kaiser Eng'r v. NLRB, 538 F.2d 1379, 1385 (9th Cir. 1976) (engineers who
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ployment conditions,"' writing letters to newspapers,"' honoring picket
lines," 5 and filing a suit"' or a complaint with a state or federal agency
against the employer." '7
As has been indicated, the techniques by which employee dissatis-
faction can be expressed are myriad. Nevertheless, the single most pow-
erful weapon at the disposal of employees is the strike. A strike may be
defined as a voluntary refusal on the part of employees to work as a
response to management's failure to agree to an employee demand."" If
the strike is lawful, it may not be construed as a repudiation of the
employment relationship; under the Act, strikers remain employees for
remedial purposes."' However, if a strike has an illegal purpose or loses
its protection for any other reason, the strikers are considered to have
forfeited their status as employees and are not entitled to reinstate-
ment. 5 1 Not only does the law distinguish between legal and illegal
lobbied legislators regarding changes in national policy affecting their job security were
protected); Bethlehem Shipbldg. Corp. v. NLRB, 114 F.2d 930, 937 (1st Cir. 1940) ithe
right of self organization includes appearance before legislative committees).
"I See Community Hosp. of Roanoke Valley, Inc. v. NLRB, 538 F.2d 607, 610 (4th
Cir. 1976) (nurse protected when she appeared on television and gave statements concern-
ing the number of nurses employed and wages).
M See Reading Hosp. & Medical Center, 226 N.L.R.B. 611, 614 (1976) (employee
cannot be discharged for openly considering writing a letter to a newspaper about working
conditions in a hospital).
"4 See Kellog Co. v. NLRB, 457 F.2d 519, 522 (6th Cir. 1972) (employees protected
when they honored picket line of another union); William S. Carroll, Inc., 232 N.L.R.B.
No. 148 (1977) (employee protected even thoughhis failure to cross picket line caused
employer to lose some business); Wheeling Elec. Co., 182 N.L.R.B. 218, 222 (1970) (refus-
ing to cross picket line is protected activity).
,,1 See Altex Ready Mixed Concrete Corp. v. NLRB, 542 F.2d 295, 297 (5th Cir. 1976)
(filing a labor-related civil action in good faith was a protected activity); Leviton Mfg.
Co. v. NLRB, 486 F.2d 686, 689 (1st Cir. 1973) (labor-related civil action is protected if
brought in good faith); Ambulance Serv. of New Bedford, Inc., 229 N.L.R.B. 106, 109-10
(1977) (employee's filing suit to recover wages owed when employer's check bounced held
protected activity).
"I See NLRB v. Whitfield Pickle Co., 374 F.2d 576, 582 (5th Cir. 1967) (filing unfair
labor practice charges is protected activity); Nash v. Florida Indus. Comm'n, 205 So. 2d
700, 703 (Fla.) (employer may not hinder employee who wishes to file unfair labor practice
charges), affl'd, 389 U.S. 235 (1967); G.V.R., Inc., 201 N.L.R.B. 147, 153-54 (1974) (em-
ployee protected when he told government interviewers that employer required kickbacks
on government contract job).
"4 NLRB v. Fansteel Metallurgical Corp., 306 U.S. 240, 256 (1939).
" Id. at 256; see NLRB v. Mackay Radio & Tel. Co., 304 U.S. 333, 347 (1938) (strike
in connection with a current labor dispute is not renunciation of employment relation).
1" See Southern Steamship Co. v. NLRB, 316 U.S. 31, 48 (1942) (employees striking
in violation of federal mutiny laws not entitled to reinstatement); NLRB v. Blades Mfg.
Corp., 344 F.2d 998, 1004 (8th Cir. 1965) (illegal strikes are not protected, citing NLRB
v. Washington Aluminum Co., 370 U.S. 9, 17 (1962)).
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strikes, it further differentiates between two categories of legal strikers.
When the strike is actuated by such typical concerns as wages or em-
ployment terms and conditions, generally in a non-union context, the
employees are considered economic strikers. Economic strikers are enti-
tled to reinstatement only if permanent replacements have not been
hired during the strike.'5 ' In contradistinction, workers protesting unfair
labor practices by management, such as failure to bargain in good
faith,'5 are viewed as unfair-labor-practice strikers and are entitled to
unconditional reinstatement.' Thus, neither strikes nor strikers are of
a single species. It is therefore essential that both labor and manage-
ment properly characterize the nature of the strike in which they are
involved in order to define clearly the respective rights of each side.
Moreover, it must be noted that a strike is a double-edged sword.
The infliction of economic injury flows in both directions. It is true that
management's productivity may be substantially impaired, if not en-
tirely destroyed, by a strike. It is equally true that an employee has no
right to be paid while he is striking.'" This latter fact certainly militates
against frivolous or unreasonably lengthy strikes.
Furthermore, the principle is deeply imbedded in our common law
tradition that rights do not exist independently of responsibilities.' 5 In
addition, the federal regulatory scheme that the NLRB sought to incul-
cate was designed to establish relative equality in bargaining power
between labor and management. Thus, if the employer can fill positions
during a strike, he should be free to do so. Moreover, employees should
,' First Nat'l Bank v. NLRB, 413 F.2d 921, 925 (8th Cir. 1969).
, See Adams Potato Chips, Inc. v. NLRB, 430 F.2d 90, 91 (6th Cir.) (employers must
bargain in good faith with their employees about "wages, hours, and other terms and
conditions of employment"), cert. denied, 401 U.S. 975 (1970). See also 29 U.S.C. § 158(d)
(1976).
3 See generally NLRB v. Shenandoah-Dives Mining Co., 145 F.2d 542, 547 (10th Cir.
1944) (enforced order requiring employer to reinstate striking employees when their posi-
tions had been filled by unfair labor practice since their replacements were hired after
strike had terminated); Cox, The Right to Engage in Concerted Activities, 26 IND. L.J.
319, 319 n.3 (1953).
,51 See NLRB v. Montgomery Ward & Co., 157 F.2d 486, 496 (8th Cir. 1946) (though
employees undoubtedly had right to strike they could not continue to work, accept wages,
and refuse to do work at employer's damage); C.G. Conn, Std. v. NLRB, 108 F.2d 390,
396-97 (7th Cir. 1939) (employee cannot be on strike and at work simultaneously); John
S. Swift Co., 124 N.L.R.B. 394, 396-97 (1959) (employees may not work regular hours and
then "strike" after hours to avoid overtime work).
"' Cone Mill Corp. v. NLRB, 413 F.2d 445 (4th Cir. 1969). "Few rights, including the
right to strike in protest, exist without corresponding duties and obligations to those
against whom the right is being asserted. When one attempts to exercise a claimed right,




not be free to enjoy the benefits of employment without accepting the
duties of being employed. Therefore, employees who engage in, an in-
plant work stoppage and who refuse either to resume their work or to
leave the plant can be lawfully discharged. ' Similarly, slow-downs' 51
and sporadic work-stoppages are not protected.' 58 The logic supporting
this rule has two components. First, the ability to engage in "partial
strikes" tilts the legislatively-mandated balance of power too far in the
favor of labor. 5 Second, it is unjust to accept the benefits of employ-
ment without accepting the commensurate responsibilities of being an
employee-preimminently, the duty to work for the person that pays
one's salary. In addition, the "partial strike" subjects the employer to
potentially devastating economic damage with no countervailing threat
to employees. It is, therefore, hardly astonishing that "partial strikes"
are generally not protected.1'"
Although most strikes are called by unions, strikes by non-
unionized workers are also protected within the limitations previously
'I ld. at 454.
"7 See Glass Guard Indus., Inc., 218 N.L.R.B. 176, 185 (1975) (employees validly
discharged for engaging in slow-down). Though slow downs would obviously be effective
for employees, there is a general attitude of public condemnation of occupying a job and
receiving pay while refusing to perform. Cox, supra note 153, at 338. But see Schatzki,
Some Observations and Suggestions Concerning a Misnomer- "Protected" Concerted
Activity, 47 TEx. L. REv. 378, 379-82 (1969) (advocating the protection of partial strikes).
"I See Automobile Workers v. Wisconsin Employment Relation Bd., 336 U.S. 245,
264-65 (1949) (state employment agency may prohibit intermittent, unannounced work
stoppages); Cincinnati Gasket, Packing & Mfg., Inc., 146 N.L.R.B. 851, 863-64 (1964)
(discussing union during working hours and refusing to work overtime had a detrimental
effect on production and was not protected); Pacific Tel. & Tel. Co., 107 N.L.R.B. 1547,
1549-50 (1952) (hit and run work stoppages not protected).
15' See Cox, supra note 153, at 339. "Slowdowns and similar disobedience on the job
cost the employees nothing and, if they were protected activities, management would be
helpless to resist. Hence such weapons are too effective to permit them to be part of the
employee's arsenal." Id.
,0 See Getman, supra note 3, at 1231-38. The theory underlying nonprotection for
partial strikes was summarized by the Eighth Circuit:
Employees may seek to change any term or condition of their employment and
their ultimate sanction is a strike .... [Wlhat makes any work stoppage
unprotected ... [is] . . . the refusal or failure of the employee to assume the
status of strikers, with its consequent loss of pay and risk of being replaced.
Employees who choose to withhold their services because of a dispute ... may
properly be required to do so by striking unequivocally. They may not simulta-
neously walk off their jobs but retain the benefits of working .... A work
stoppage does not lose its presumptive protection merely because it is limited
in duration. If employees have not been replaced while they were away from
work, they must be reinstated when they offer to return.
First Nat'l Bank v. NLRB, 413 F.2d 921, 923-24 (8th Cir. 1964). But see Schatzki, supra
note 157, at 379-82.
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indicated. In one leading case, First National Bank v. NLRB,"' non-
union employees ceased working at the end of their regular shift to
protest excessive overtime demands by the employer. 62 Relying on the
doctrine that workers cannot simultaneously be on strike and expect to
continue to work for pay, management refused to permit the "strikers"
to return to work during ordinary hours." 3 Nevertheless, the Eighth
Circuit declared this wholesale firing to be illegal. The court reasoned
that since the strike was in itself a protected concerted activity, the fact
that it took place at the end of the work day did not strip it of its
protected status."' Furthermore, since the employees were not union-
ized, they had not by collective bargaining established channels through
which protests could be registered, and had therefore not violated the
terms of a collectively-bargained-for agreement. 5 Thus, management
could legally discharge only those economic strikers for whom it had
found replacements during the course of the strike.'
In First National Bank, the employee action was essentially what
might be termed a symbolic strike. This sort of strike, being a singular
and isolated event, is not intended to inflict serious economic damage
upon the employer but rather graphically to bring to the employers'
attention the grievance of the workers. Such activities are generally
presumed to be strikes protected under section 7, especially if the work-
ers are not unionized and therefore have no bargained-for procedures for
expressing worker dissatisfaction. 7 This presumption may, however, be
rebutted by evidence that the work stoppage is part of an on-going
scheme for future intermittent "strikes." Under the latter circumstan-
ces, the employees' behavior is no longer consistent with their duty
either to assume the status of bona fide strikers or to resume working."61
Nevertheless, if workers have no established grievance proce-
dures,' short spontaneous work stoppages may be protected'" so long
"' 413 F.2d 921 (8th Cir. 1969).
16 Id. at 923.
I6 /d.
" ld. at 925-26.
"u Id. at 926. The court distinguished these circumstances from the facts in NLRB
v. R.C. Can Co., 328 F.2d 974, 979 (5th Cir. 1964), where the employees were in the process
of negotiating a new contract when a "wildcat strike" occurred. Id.
"' Id. at 925.
"7 Polytech, Inc., 195 N.L.R.B. 695, 696 (1972); see NLRB v. Washington Aluminum
Co., 370 U.S. 9, 14 (1962) (spontaneous walkout by seven employees acting without a
designated representative to protest cold working conditions not protected).
"' 195 N.L.R.B. at 696.
"' See NLRB v. Washington Aluminum Co., 370 U.S. 9, 14 (1962).
See NLRB v. Pepsi Cola Bottling Co., 449 F.2d 824, 827-30 (5th Cir. 1971) (peace-
ful sit-down of 97 employees protected). See also Stewart Die Casting Corp. v. NLRB, 114
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as there are no threats or acts of violence and the work place is not
seized.' Moreover, in accordance with the principle that unorganized
workers must express their dissatisfaction as best they can, "2 such em-
ployees are entitled to remain on company property in order to bring
their grievance to the attention of management. Of course, the work
stoppage must be of brief duration and may not be part of an intended
pattern of periodic refusals to work.' In addition, even where there is
an extant grievance procedure, it may with impunity be circumvented
by the workers if it was unilaterally promulgated by management."'
Thus, the employer may not protect itself from unauthorized expres-
sions of worker dissatisfaction by establishing on its own arbitrary and
unreasonably narrow means through which protests can be registered.
Obviously, the purpose of a strike is to bring economic pressure to
bear on the employer. Yet, since the exercise of section 7 rights overbal-
ances any loss occasioned by a short term interruption of production,
adverse economic impact upon the company does not deprive the work
stoppage of protection.7 5 Nevertheless, if the impact is significant or if
misconduct is involved, protection may be forfeited.' In addition, as a
general rule, a strike may not retain its protected status if it inflicts
economic harm upon the company without simultaneously conferring
some compensatory gain upon workers. 7 7 Consequently, wanton and
F.2d 849, 855-56 (7th Cir. 1940) (since employer treated employees who staged a sit-down
the same as strikers of a subsequent strike those in the sit-down were protected), cert.
denied, 312 U.S. 680 (1941).
"I See NLRB v. Fansteel Metallurgical Corp., 306 U.S. 240, 248-51 (1939).
172 NLRB v. Washington Aluminum Co., 370 U.S. 9, 14-15 (1962).
"I See Crenlo v. NLRB, 529 F.2d 201, 204 (8th Cir. 1975) (nonviolent legitimate work
stoppage protected); NLRB v. J.I. Case Co., 198 F.2d 919, 922 (8th Cir. 1952) (employees
retain protection for stoppage to present grievance); NLRB v. Kennametal, Inc., 182 F.2d
817, 819 (3d Cir. 1950) (employees have right to meet with management to present griev-
ances).
"' See Essex Int'l, 213 N.L.R.B. 260, 266-67 (1974) (refusal of employees to return to
work until allegedly defective equipment was repaired was protected activity even though
the employees did not utilize the grievance procedure set up unilaterally by the employer).
"' See Crenlo v. NLRB, 529 F.2d 201, 204 (8th Cir. 1975) (shutdown of work for
approximately one hour to compel management to discuss pay raise was protected);
Columbia Univ., 236 N.L.R.B. No. 84, 98 L.R.R.M. 1353 (1978) (shortlived interruption
of services to protest the discharge of employee was protected activity).
"I See AMP, Inc., 218 N.L.R.B. 33, 36 (1975) (discharge of employee for protesting
the firing of another employee unlawful despite fact that employee closed production to
make protest). For an application of the principle see Columbia Univ., 236 N.L.R.B. No.
84, 98 L.R.R.M. 1353 (1978). But see NLRB v. Lasaponara & Sons, 541 F.2d 992, 998 (2d
Cir. 1976) (concerted refusal to work on religious holiday as protest of holiday work pro-
tected even though employer suffered heavy economic loss because of heavy holiday pro-
duction schedule).
" NLRB v. Lasaponara & Sons, 541 F.2d 992, 998 (2d Cir. 1976); see Dobbs House,
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purely punitive strikes are not protected.
The strike is, as previously indicated, the most powerful weapon in
the arsenal of section 7 rights.7 8 Yet, in a non-union context, a prolonged
strike is rarely fruitful and therefore seldom used. Like letters, petitions,
and meetings, strikes by non-union workers are generally utilized as a
means of expressing employee sentiment rather than as an economic
weapon.
A matter closely related to the right to strike is the right to honor
lawful picket lines. 7 ' As a general rule, the picket line the employee
refuses to cross must be lawfully protected under the Act in order for
the employee's refusal, in turn, to be protected. 80 The scope of this
protection is not as substantial as might be expected. Indeed, the em-
ployer may permanently replace, but may not discharge, an employee
who refuses to cross a picket line. The employer must, however, estab-
lish that the refusal to work substantially interfered with the employer's
business operations and that this disruption could not be remedied by
merely assigning the recalcitrant employee's work to another em-
ployee.' 8' One cannot help but wonder if the nicety of this distinction
between replacement and discharge is not a distinction without a differ-
ence.1'1.
Inc. v. NLRB, 325 F.2d 531, 532 (5th Cir. 1963) (departure of waitresses at dinner hour
unprotected). An example of unprotected activity was a strike timed to coincide with the
moment when molten iron was ready to be poured off at a foundry, and lack of sufficient
help to carry out the operation could have caused substantial property damage and loss
to the employer. NLRB v. Marshall Car Wheel & Foundry Co., 218 F.2d 409, 411 (5th Cir.
1955).
"I See NLRB v. Insurance Agents' Union, 361 U.S. 477, 489 (1960) (use of economic
weapons often induces one to come to terms desired by another); McGraw Lab., 206
N.L.R.B. 602, 604 (1973) (a strike to bring pressure upon an employer to change terms
and conditions of employment is an economic weapon designed to cause the employer to
meet the demands of the strikers).
'T' See note 28 supra.
' Illustrative of this point is Capital Times Co., 234 N.L.R.B. No. 62, 97 L.R.R.M.
1184 (1978), where the Board considered a situation in which an employee had honored a
picket line set up by state employees. Since state employees are not covered by the Act,
they are not defined as "employees." The Board, in upholding the right of the employer
to discipline the employee, stated: "An employee cannot engage in concerted activities
within the meaning of section seven with nonemployees who are not entitled to the protec-
tion of the Act." Id.
" Overnite Transp. Co., 154 N.L.R.B. 1271, 1274-75 (1965); Redwing Carriers, Inc.,
137 N.L.R.B. 1545, 1547 (1962).
".' That the discharge-replacement distinction is a distinction without a difference
has not been unremarked. See Schatzki, supra note 157, at 382-92. This distinction has
also been criticized by the Supreme Court. NLRB v. Rockaway News Supply Co., 345 U.S.
71, 75 (1952). See generally R. GoRANs, LABOR LAw 353-54 (1976).
[VOL. 49
PROTECTED CONCERTED ACTIVITY
IV. CIRCUMSTANCES WHICH CAUSE THE Loss OF PROTECTION
UNDER SECTION 7
Although the activities discussed above are usually protected, there
are circumstances which, if present, deprive these activities of protec-
tion. For the purposes of this article, such circumstances will be catego-
rized as follows: (1) disloyalty; (2) use of unreasonable means; (3) dis-
ruption of business; (4) threats, violence or illegal conduct; and (5)
opprobrious, egregious or flagrant conduct."2
A. Disloyalty
Although it has been stated that "[tihere is no more elemental
cause for discharge of an employee than disloyalty to his employer,"' '
this blanket condemnation is so broad that it is not so clear as it might
seem.' The problem is further compounded by the propensity of both
the Board and the courts to decide similar cases in different ways on the
basis of minor factual differences.'8 5 Nonetheless, since disloyalty re-
moves the cloak of section 7 protection from employee actions, the labor
attorney should be aware of the situation in which such acts have been
found to violate the duty of loyalty owed to the employer.
In NLRB v. Knuth Brothers, Inc.,'" a union employee in a non-
union, subcontractor plant ignored orders from the prime contractor and
directly communicated with the ultimate customer to inform the con-
sumer that a non-union plant had been awarded the subcontract.'87 The
Seventh Circuit rejected the employee's contention that his actions were
protected, since he had acted in reckless disregard of Knuth Brothers'
,82 See generally Gregory, Unprotected Activity and the NLRA, 39 VA. L. REV. 421
(1953).
"1 NLRB v. Local 1229, I.B.E.W., 346 U.S. 464, 472 (1953).
I" Disloyalty can include anything from interference with employer's business rela-
tions and breach of confidence to the dissemination of maliciously false statements. See
NLRB v. Local 1229, I.B.E.W., 346 U.S. 464, 477 (1953) (distribution of malicious leaflets
to public held to constitute disloyalty); NLRB v. Knuth Bros., Inc., 537 F.2d 950, 952 (7th
Cir. 1976) (interference with employer's business relations through a breach of onfidence
is disloyalty).
19 Compare NLRB v. Local 1229, I.B.E.W., 346 U.S. 464, 477 (1953) (distribution of
malicious leaflets to public held to be disloyalty) and NLRB v. Knuth Bros. Inc., 537 F.2d
950, 952 (7th Cir. 1976) (contact of ultimate consumer despite contractor's orders held to
constitute disloyalty) with NLRB v. Circle Bindery, Inc., 536 F.2d 447, 450 (1st Cir. 1976)
(activity held not to be disloyalty where union member in non-union plant had union
officials contact ultimate consumer) and American Hosp. Ass'n, 230 N.L.R.B. 54, 56-57
(1977) (distribution of grievance leaflets on plant grounds held not disloyalty).
"' 537 F.2d 950 (7th Cir. 1976).
IA? Id. at 952.
19781
MISSISSIPPI LA W JOURNAL
rights by tampering with its business relationships. 1'8 As a result of this
disloyalty, the employee's discharge was upheld.' 9
Knuth Brothers involved elements of breach of confidence in that
the employee deliberately disobeyed the order from the prime not to
reveal the non-union status of the subcontractor.10 Even though em-
ployees are generally entitled to use any information that comes to their
attention in the normal course of work, if the information is confidential
in nature, it may not be disclosed.' 9' On the other hand, in Jeanette
Corp.,,"' an employer's rule that salary information be kept confidential
did not remove protection from an employee's discussion of wage rates
with other employees for the purpose of seeking raises for herself and
other clericals." 3 This holding is, however, clearly consistent with the
general rule that an employer's policy cannot inhibit protected con-
certed activity."'
Although an employee who deliberately makes false or malicious
statements about the employer could well be subject to discharge or
discipline,"5 a good faith defense appears to be available to employees
' Id. at 956.
'8 Id.; Comment, NLRB v. Knuth Brothers: The Boundaries of Unprotected Disloy-
alty When a Non-Striking Employee's Section 7 Concerted Activity Threatens Employer-
Customers Relations, 125 U. PA. L. Rav. 1339 (1977).
This case should be contrasted with NLRB v. Circle Bindery, Inc., 536 F.2d 447 (1st
Cir. 1976) in which the court held that similar acts did not constitute disloyalty. The only
distinction between the two cases is the fact that in Circle Bindery the employee told a
union representative who in turn informed the customer of the fact that a non-union plant
was working on the job, instead of calling the customer himself, as was done in Knuth
Brothers. Id. at 450.
'" 537 F.2d at 952.
'" Ridgley Mfg. Co., 207 N.L.R.B. 193, 196-97 (1973), enforced, 510 F.2d 185 (D.C.
Cir. 1975). A question may arise concerning what confidential material is. Compare
Murray-Ohio Mfg. Co., 148 N.L.R.B. 1541, 1550 (1964) (lists of employees obtained from
timekeepers to aid union organization were not confidential), enforced, 358 F.2d .948 (6th
Cir. 1966) with Farlow Rubber Supply, Inc., 193 N.L.R.B. 570, 573 (1971) (confidentiality
evidenced by fact that the information was kept in a fireproof vault).
I,2 217 N.L.RB. 653 (1975), enforced, 532 F.2d 916 (3d Cir. 1976).
"I 217.N.L.R.B. at 656. The court reasoned that the employer's prohibition of em-
ployees' discussing wage rates among themselves was clearly an impediment to protected
concerted activity. Id.
"I See Transportation Lease Serv., Inc., 232 N.L.R.B. No. 21, 96 L.R.R.M. 1254
(1977) (Act proscribes any employer's inhibition of employees' exercise of protected con-
certed activity). Illustrative of this proposition is the case of Howard Mfg. Co., 227
N.L.R.B. 1858 (1977), in which it was found that a walkout that was otherwise protected
did not lose its protection because of the employer's rule that employees could not leave
their stations without permission. Id. at 1865.
"I See, e.g., NLRB v. Local 1229, I.B.E.W., 346 U.S. 464, 477 (1953) (malicious
leaflets to public held to constitute disloyalty); Indiana Gearworks v. NLRB, 371 F.2d 273,
275 (7th Cir. 1967) (malicious cartoons posted in plant held unprotected).
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whose protests are based on false information. The Board has stated
that, "[eJmployees do not forfeit the protection of the Act if, in voicing
their dissatisfaction with matters of common concern, they give cur-
rency to inaccurate information provided it is not deliberately or mali-
ciously false.""' Therefore, employees have been protected when they
filed suit against their employer even though the suit was found to be
groundless, because it was filed in good faith and was thus not prompted
by malice." 7 Since the test for this aspect of disloyalty is the presence
of malice, each case will turn on its particular facts.'
Since virtually all activities protected under section 7 are, at least
arguably, acts of disloyalty to the employer, the courts are forced to
apply some sort of balancing test as between these competing rights.
Thus, the courts will deny section 7 protection only upon a showing that
the disloyalty is so egregious that it overshadows the employees' rights
under the Act."'
B. Unreasonable Means to the End
In order for the activity to be protected, the type of concerted activ-
ity used must be reasonably related to the ends sought to be achieved.
"I Walls Mfg. Co., 137 N.L.R.B. 1317, 1319 (1962), enforced, 321 F.2d 753 (1963), cert.
denied, 375 U.S. 923 (1963). See also Owens-Coming Fiberglass Corp. v. NLRB, 407 F.2d
1357, 1365 (4th Cir. 1969) (distribution of handbill that contained only two minor errors
was not so distorted as to show malicious intent).
"I Trinity Trucking & Materials Corp., 221 N.L.R.B. 364, 365 (1975), supplemented,
227 N.L.R.B. 792 (1977); see Marlin Firearms Co., 116 N.L.R.B. 1834, 1834-40 (1962)
(employee protected since statements were not made with intent to maliciously injure the
employer).
I" In NLRB v. Local 1229, I.B.E.W., 346 U.S. 464 (1953), public distribution of
leaflets disparaging the employer was held to be disloyal and indefensible. Id. at 477.
Similarly, in Indiana Gearworks v. NLRB, 371 F.2d 273. (7th Cir. 1967), the display of
cartoons maliciously ridiculing management was held to be unprotected. Id. at 275.
Yet in National Hosp. Ass'n, 230 N.L.R.B. 54 (1977), the Board extended protection
to the distribution of protest leaflets that contained sarcastic and insulting material on
the ground that the employees were seeking to change what they believed were inappro-
priate management decisions and were not maliciously seeking to harm the company. See
also Tower Foods, Inc., 221 N.L.R.B. 1260, 1267 (1975) (distribution of letter to co-
employees accusing employer of incompetence, lack of foresight, racial discrimination,
and favoritism in hiring and firing held protected activity); cf. NLRB v. Fruit & Vegetable
Packers Local 760, 377 U.S. 58, 63-64 (1964) (strikers may appeal to the customer's
sympathy by encouraging them to boycott employer's product for the duration of strike).
'" See Getman, supra note 3, at 1238-40.
Perhaps the Supreme Court said it best in the case NLRB v. Local 1229, I.B.E.W.,
346 U.S. 464 (1953). "[The] activities [were] characterized as 'indefensible' because
they were found to show a disloyalty to the workers' employer which this Court deemed
unnecessary to carry on the workers' legitimate concerted activities." Id. at 477.
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The landmark decision in this area is NLRB v. Washington Aluminum
Co.2m In that case employees staged a walkout to protest the extreme
cold in the shop. The Supreme Court stated that since the employees
had "no bargaining representative and, in fact, no representative of any
kind to present their grievances to their employer. . . they had to speak
for themselves, as best they could."' The Court noted the absence of
an established procedure to present grievances to the company, and
stated that when circumstances were considered in view of the ex-
tremely cold conditions, the concerted activity of the men in leaving
their jobs was a perfectly natural and reasonable thing to do. 02 The
Court concluded that:
[Section] 7 does not protect all concerted activities . . . .The activi-
ties engaged in here do not fall within the normal categories of unpro-
tected concerted activities such as those which are unlawful, violent,
or in breach of contract. Nor can they be brought under this Court's
more recent pronouncement which denied the protection of § 7 to activ-
ities characterized as "indefensible" because they were there found to
show a disloyalty to the workers' employer which this Court deemed
unnecessary to carry on the workers' legitimate concerted activities
... . Indeed, concerted activities by employees for the purpose of
trying to protect themselves from working conditions as uncomfortable
as the testimony and Board findings showed them to be in this case are
unquestionably activities to correct conditions which modern labor-
management legislation treats as too bad to have to be tolerated in a
humane and civilized society like ours."
In such a case, a spontaneous walkout is protected regardless of whether
the employees make their demands before, during or after the concerted
activity.201
The walkout in Washington Aluminum should be contrasted with
cases in which the courts determined that a walkout was an unreasona-
ble and therefore unprotected means to the end sought by the workers.
In Dobbs House, Inc. v. NLRB,0 5 the employer's waitresses were dis-
charged for leaving the restaurant in order to protest the apparent dis-
charge of a supervisor. The Fifth Circuit stated that although concerted
activity in protest of a change in supervisory personnel is protected when
the supervisory position in question is directly related to the employees'
370 U.S. 9 (1962).
' Id. at 14.
' Id. at 16.
20 Id. at 17 (footnotes omitted).
2" Id. at 14; accord, Electronic Design & Dev. Co. v. NLRB, 409 F.2d 631, 634 (9th
Cir. 1969).
2- 325 F.2d 531 (5th Cir. 1963).
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own employment,' the method of protest used must be reasonably
related to the desired goal.' The court then held that since the depar-
ture en masse of the waitresses at the dinner hour was not a reasonable
method of protesting the supervisor's discharge, the concerted activity
had lost its protection.'
As a comparison of Washington Aluminum and Dobbs House re-
veals, reasonableness of employee actions depends largely upon the
nature of the goal the employees hope to achieve through their actions.
As long as their purpose is to protest matters that are of direct concern
to them, greater leeway will be allowed to the employees' choice of
methods. However, as the object of the protest approaches matters
traditionally within the discretion of management, the means used
must be ever more reasonable, and, at some point, at least by inference,
must involve only expressions of sentiment, not economic pressure on
the employer. 09
C. Disruption of Business
The right of employees to engage in protected concerted activity
must be balanced against the employer's right to maintain order and
control in the plant. Southwestern Bell Telephone Co. ,210 illustrates this
principle well. Some of the employees of the Telephone Company began
wearing sweatshirts displaying the slogan "Ma Bell is a Cheap Mother"
in protest of the employer's wage offers made in the context of collective
bargaining. The employer directed the employees to remove or to cover
the shirts during work time.2 1' No violation of section 8(a)(1) was found
because this demand by the employer was determined to be reasonable
Id. at 537. Compare NLRB v. Ford Radio & Mica Corp., 258 F.2d 457, 463 (2d Cir.
1958) (concerted activity to influence the hiring, firing or conditions of employment of
supervisory personnel is unprotected) and NLRB v. Coal Creek Coal Co., 204 F.2d 579,
582 (10th Cir. 1953) (strike to protest discharge of a supervisor is not concerted activity
for mutual aid or protection) with NLRB v. Guernsey-Muskingum Elec. Coop., Inc., 285
F.2d 8, 12 (6th Cir. 1960) (protesting the appointment of an unqualified foreman held
protected activity since it would adversely effect employees' jobs) and NLRB v. Phoenix
Mut. Life Ins. Co., 167 F.2d 983, 988 (7th Cir. 1948) (discharge of employees for protesting
the hiring of an incompetent cashier unlawful).
"1 325 F.2d at 539.
IN Id. Of similar import is the case Henning & Cheadle, Inc. v. NLRB, 522 F.2d 1050
(7th Cir. 1975), where employees had walked off the job to protest the firing of a supervi-
sor. The court found that, because of important departmental deadlines, the activity was
not a reasonable method for the employees' use in communicating their concern to the
employer. The walkout was therefore unprotected such that the employees were subject
to discipline. Id. at 1055.
'm See Getman, supra note 3, at 1211.
10 200 N.L.R.B. 667 (1972), noted in 74 CoLUM. L. REv. 117 (1974).
"1 200 N.L.R.B. at 667-68.
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and necessary to maintain discipline and harmonious employee-
employer relations in the operation of the business. 21 2 The Board held
that in view of the controversial nature of the language and the fact that
it was subject to a profane construction, the employer could legitimately
ban the shirts as a reasonable precaution against discord and bitterness
between the employees and management, and to assure decorum and
discipline in the plant."3
In contrast to the Southwestern Bell case, a grievance meeting was
held to be protected in NLRB v. Sutherland Lumber Co."' even though
it lasted thirty minutes, and even though the discussion was loud,
heated, and replete with earthy expressions. There were customers in
the yard adjoining the shed in which the meeting was being held, and
one customer came to the shed to find out what was going on."'5 The
employer argued that these circumstances constituted a disruption of
his business. However, the court found that the type of language used
was used by others in the yard and was condoned by the company, and
that the meeting did not constitute a disruption of business. 16
D. Threats, Violence, or Illegal Conduct
A strike in violation of law is not protected. In Southern Steamship
Co. v. NLRB 2 11 a strike that violated mutiny laws was held unpro-
tected;"1 8 similarly, in The American News Co. ,21 a strike to force a wage
increase prior to its approval by the War Labor Board was held to be
unprotected.2
There will certainly be situations, however, when the strike, al-
l" Id. at 671; accord, Caterpillar Tractor Co. v. NLRB, 230 F.2d 357, 358-59 (7th Cir.
1956) (upheld employer's ban on badges bearing "Don't be a scab"); Boeing Airplane Co.
v. NLRB, 217 F.2d 369, 374-75 (9th Cir. 1954) (bar of union buttons was legitimate in a
"highly explosive" rival union situation). But cf. NLRB v. Mayrath Co., 319 F.2d 424,
426-27 (7th Cir. 1963) (sanctioned the use of insignia which did not interfere with disci-
pline).
22 200 N.L.R.B. at 671.
21 452 F.2d 67 (7th Cir. 1971).
2 Id. at 69-70.
2, Id. Compare American Hosp. Ass'n, 230 N.L.R.B. 54, 57 (1977) (distribution of
publication by employees that criticized management policies was not inherently disrup-
tive of discipline, nor was it offensive, obscene, or obnoxious) with Diagnostic Center
Hosp. Corp., 228 N.L.R.B. 1215, 1217 (1977) (employee's phone call protesting working
conditions was protected though made outside normal chain of authority and may have
jeopardized employer's relationship with another institution).
212 316 U.S. 31 (1942).
2" Id. at 40.
21, 55 N.L.R.B. 1302 (1944).
m Id. at 1305.
[VOL. 49
PROTECTED CONCERTED ACTIVITY
though replete with threats and acts of violence, does not itself violate
any specific law. In such a situation, only those employees who have
engaged in illegal acts will lose their section 7 protection.2 ' The land-
mark case in this area is NLRB v. Fansteel Metallurgical Corp. 22 The
activity in question in the Fansteel case was a sit-down strike during
which employees seized and retained possession of the company's prop-
erty for a period of several days and committed various acts of viol-
ence.2 1 The Court held that depriving the employer of its right to posses-
sion of its property was an unlawful act, no matter how reprehensible
the employer's pre-strike conduct might have been.2 1 The Supreme
Court stated that "[tlo justify such conduct because of the existence
of a labor dispute or of an unfair labor practice would be to put a
premium on resort to force instead of legal remedies and to subvert the
principles of law and order which lie at the foundations of society."2 25
E. Opprobrious, Egregious or Flagrant Conduct
Behavior of this type generally arises during a discussion of griev-
ances. Employees forfeit section 7 protection only in "flagrant cases in
which misconduct is so violent or of such nature as to render the em-
ployee unfit for further service. ' '221 The standard for determining
whether statements or conduct by employees at a grievance meeting are
so opprobrious as to remove the protection of the Act is guided by the
same principles applicable to a debate during collective bargaining.
Thus frank, if not always complimentary, exchanges of views must be
expected if such sessions are to be natural and not stilted.2 7 Probably
the best description of what constitutes unprotected behavior comes
from the case of NLRB v. Red Top, Inc. 2 In upholding the discharge
" See NLRB v. Thayer Co., 213 F.2d 748, 757 (lst Cir. 1954) (only those employees
who visited homes of non-striking employees and threatened them to respect picket line
were not entitled to reinstatement).
= 306 U.S. 240 (1939).
22 Id. at 248-49.
' Id. at 253-54.
Id. at 253. But see Republic Creosoting Co., 19 N.L.R.B. 267 (1940), in which the
Board recognized that conduct on the picket line must be viewed tolerantly because of
the friction that usually results from industrial confrontation. "[1The emotional tension
of a strike almost inevitably gives rise to a certain amount of disorder and . . . conduct
on a picket line cannot be expected to approach the etiquette' of the drawing room or
breakfast table." Id. at 288.
" Firch Bakery Co., 232 N.L.R.B. No. 120, 97 L.R.R.M. 1192, 1193 (1977) (quoting
Bettcher Mfg. Corp., 76 N.L.R.B. 526, 527 (1948)).
m See Crown Central Pet. Corp., 177 N.L.R.B. 322, 323 (1969) (reprimand and sus-
pension of two employees for accusing a company official of lying during a grievance
proceeding was unlawful).
455 F.2d 721 (8th Cir. 1972).
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of certain employees, the court found that the employees had been
[Ijnsolent, insubordinate, and intimidating; they utilized false
charges, threats of physical violence and threats of activity detrimental
to the welfare of the business operation . . . .It is of course under-
standable that tempers may flare in the course of grievance meetings
and that harsh and rough words may be exchanged between the parties
without giving rise to a basis for discharge consistent with the protec-
tions afforded under §7 of the Act. The use of the term egregious to
denote the adjectival type of conduct warranting a basis for discharge
is general in nature but appears on this record to be an apt description
of the activities of the three committee members who were discharged.
Egregious is defined in Webster's New World Dictionary as
"outstanding for undesirable qualities; remarkably bad; flagrant." We
agree . . that the conduct was insulting, threatening and disloyal to
the employer's interests; we also view such conduct as flagrant."
The misconduct at the meeting must generally be of a continuous na-
ture; thus an isolated expletiveo* or a question regarding management
"pay offs' '1 31 is not sufficient to justify discharge of the employee. The
courts are again faced with a balancing test in these cases since the
probability of impulsive behavior by employees during the exercise of
their rights"2 must be viewed in light of the employer's right to maintain
order and respect.m
CONCLUSION
All employers should be well aware of the obligations they owe to
2n Id. at 727-28.
z See Browning Indus. Venetian Marble, 213 N.L.R.B. 269, 272 (1974) (employee
who responded "piece work my ass" to efforts of management to put employees on a
piecework basis was held to be engaged in protected activity as a spokesman for other
employees); Bettcher Mfg. Corp., 76 N.L.R.B. 526, 527, 533 (1948) (discharge of employee
for calling employer a crook and a liar during a mass negotiating session between employer
and employees held unlawful).
u' NLRB v. Ben Perkin Corp., 452 F.2d 205, 207 (7th Cir. 1971).
u' See Longview Furniture Co., 100 N.L.R.B. 301 (1952) where the Board stated:
[Tihe language of these employees . . .must be regarded as an integral and
inseparable part of their [protected concerted activity] .... [Tbo suggest
that employees in the exercise of their rights and in the heat of picket line
animosity must trim their expression of disapproval to some point short of
utterances here in question, would be to ignore the industrial realities of speech
in a workaday world and to impose a serious stricture on employees in the
exercise of their rights under the Act.
Id. at 304.
'1 NLRB v. Thor Power Co., 351 F.2d 584, 587 (7th Cir. 1965).
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their employees under statutes such as Title VII of the Civil Rights Act23'
and the Fair Labor Standards Act.235 However, unless their employees
are unionized or have been approached by a union, few employers real-
ize that they have obligations under the National Labor Relations Act
as well. It is hoped that this Article has made clear some of the limita-
tions the Act places on the rights of an employer in a non-union context.
Nonetheless, one final caveat must also be adduced. When an employer
becomes aware that protected concerted activity is taking place in his
plant, he should be aware of both the legal and the practical conse-
quences of suppressing such activity. A minor grievance may be only the
tip of the iceberg. The dissatisfaction may be the beginning of union
organizational activity, or it may be nothing more than it appears to be.
In either case, the employer should deal with the situation circum-
spectly and redress any grievance his employees may have to the best
of his ability without taking adverse action against them and without
exhibiting animosity toward them. Retaliating against employees who
engage in protected concerted activity, in addition to violating their
legal rights, will compound whatever grievance the employees have and
may lead to more demonstrations of dissatisfaction. A disgruntled work-
force tends to favor unionization and economic retaliation against the
employer more often than does a workforce with whom the employer has
maintained a good relationship. Therefore, by suppressing the rights of
his employees, the employer may not only subject himself to legal liabil-
ity but may well endanger his coveted status as a non-union employer.
42 U.S.C. § 2000e (1976).
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